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Drawing on interview data from charter school policy actors in New York State, 
this study applied Kingdon‘s (1984, 1995/2002) multiple streams model to explain how 
the system of multiple statewide charter authorizers was created as part of the New York 
State Charter Schools Act of 1998.  A combination of factors influenced the emergence 
of the law and resulted in an authorizing system that included an effective set of policy 
entrepreneurs, a strong executive, and a key political opportunity. Ultimately Governor 
Pataki promoted charter school policy to high agenda prominence by deciding to use the 
issue as his desired policy in exchange for a legislative pay raise (agenda setting).  The 
findings of the study suggest that the applicability of Kingdon‘s national-level model to 
the state level is valid and features a strong participation of the state executive branch. 
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Chapter 1: Treatise Introduction 
From 2008–2012, national political forces aligned as advocates for charter 
schools.  Since taking office, President Barack Obama has further established the 
closure of underperforming charter schools and the expansion and replication of 
quality charter schools as key components of his education policy agenda via the 
Race to The Top grants program (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  At the same 
time, monies from national philanthropic foundations such as the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation (2010) were being directed to collaborative projects between 
charter schools and traditional school districts. 
As a result, some state politicians, district school boards, superintendents, and 
most teacher unions, who have long taken oppositional approaches to public school 
choice, are now reexamining their positions.  State legislators are taking fresh looks at 
their charter laws.  Illinois, Indiana, and Tennessee are among the states that have 
already amended their laws as a result of the federal focus.  A key component of any 
charter law is the process by which charters are created or authorized.  
Charter school authorizers are entities charged by law to approve new schools, 
oversee ongoing performance, and evaluate the performance of public charter schools 
in order to make renewal decisions.  Most often in the form of state or local boards of 
education, universities or colleges, special-purpose boards, municipal bodies, or 
nonprofits, authorizers oversee charter schools‘ observance of the law as well as 




Charter school laws were enacted throughout around the country as an effort 
to reform public schooling.  Charter schools are designed to serve a variety of 
political and educational objectives.  From the outset of their creation in the early 
1990s, the proposition was that these schools would be granted greater autonomy than 
traditional public school districts and, in return, be held to high standards of 
accountability.  With greater autonomy, these schools would be able to innovate 
structural and instructional systems, yielding findings from which all schools could 
benefit (Manno, 1998; L. Nathan & Myatt, 1998).  Other objectives of the creation of 
charter laws, depending on the state, included providing choice to parents, increased 
competition to traditional public schools, and greater accountability across the public 
school sector (Lake, 2008). 
State governments first created charter school laws in 1991.   A review of the 
research indicated that it is still too early to report how successful charter schools are 
at accomplishing each of the above stated objectives.  Thus far, charters show mixed 
levels of success in producing higher levels of student achievement (Center for 
Education Reform, 2010; Consoletti, 2011; Hoxby & Murarka, 2009; Raymond, 
2010).  Recent evidence has indicated that charters are leading to the closure of the 
achievement gap between students from poorer districts and those from more affluent 
communities (Hoxby & Murarka, 2009; Raymond, 2010).  The impact of charters can 
be seen in a limited, anecdotal basis in the charter-like decisions made by 
superintendents around the country (Lake, 2008). 
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The way charters are created, or authorized, in each state is a key feature of 
the chartering process.  Authorizing organizations provide states opportunities to 
ensure quality control for charters—the gatekeepers. These organizations generally 
decide (a) which groups and people may run charter schools, (b) how to evaluate the 
schools throughout the charter term, and (c) if or when to allow the school to continue 
operation.  Given the decentralized, state-based nature of American education policy, 
the landscape of charter authorizing systems and structures around the country widely 
varies.  Thus, states range greatly in the numbers and types of charter school 
authorizers they allow.  When states have single authorizers, those authorizers are 
normally local boards of education or state education departments.  State education 
departments, universities, nonprofits, and school districts have this authorizing 
responsibility to varying degrees in the District of Columbia and the 39 states that 
have charter laws.   
Recognition of authorizers‘ role in charter school success led to increased 
attention to charter-granting entities.  Researchers and experts have begun to report 
on authorizer effectiveness and on state policies concerning charter school 
authorizers.  Early research showed potential advantages of multiple authorizers; as 
such, several states have adopted or amended legislation to allow for multiple charter-
school authorizers in recent years (Bierlein Palmer, 2006).  Overall, 80% of the 
nation‘s charter schools exist in states with multiple charter-school authorizers 
(Center for Education Reform, 2007, 2008b).  Three outcomes of multiple authorizing 
structures appear to have led to their being featured across the country:   
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1.  They increase the quantity of charter schools (U.S. Department of 
Education Office of Innovation and Improvement, 2007).  
2.  They protect the charter school environment from political pressures 
(National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2009; National Association 
of Charter School Authorizers, 2009b).  
3.  They allow for greater quality practice sharing throughout the state and 
sector (U.S. Department of Education Office of Innovation and 
Improvement, 2007).  
The creation of multiple authorizing structures can also induce unintended 
consequences.  In settings where authorizers receive a portion of the schools‘ per-
pupil revenue as opposed to, or in addition to, direct, legislatively directed revenue, 
there can exist an erosion of standards in the name of attracting charters to the 
portfolio (Bierlein Palmer, Terrell, Hassell, & Svahn, 2006).  Limited research, such 
as a recent study by the Center for Research on Education Outcomes (Raymond, 
2009), found a negative impact of multiple authorizers on statewide charter school 
student performance.   
Differences in authorizing philosophy and practice can also vary significantly 
within the same state.  A growing body of research suggests that the state policy 
environment is crucial to the success of charter schools and charter school authorizers 
(Bierlein Palmer, 2006; Bierlein Palmer & Gau, 2003; Hassel, Ziebarth, & Steiner, 
2006).  Different types of charter school authorizers are exposed to different forms 
and amounts of political pressures.  Some types of authorizers tend to act more 
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negatively toward charter schools than others (Lake, 2006; Vergari, 2001).  Local 
district authorizers and state boards of education, for instance, consistently have been 
found to be among those authorizers most likely to be affected by politics (Bierlein 
Palmer, 2006; Bierlein Palmer & Gau, 2003; Gau, 2006; Hassel & Batdorff, 2004; 
Hill et al., 2001).   
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework 
Because authorizing is a high-impact piece of any charter school policy, it is 
important to expand research on charter schools to include more detailed analysis of 
multiple authorizing structures.  There is a dearth of research on how and why states 
have designed their authorizing structures.  John W. Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) multiple 
streams framework for policy making is a potentially useful method to examine the 
design of multiple authorizing structures, given its widely referenced application to 
public policy making.  Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) work provided a useful framework 
that described how certain items make it to the top of the governmental agenda, and 
how policy entrepreneurs are responsible for bringing attention to the issues and 
coupling solutions to problems.  In doing so, Kingdon (1995/2002) provided three 
―streams‖: (a) the problem stream, often identified via ―focusing events‖; (b) the 
policy stream, which may produce alternatives and proposals; and (c) the political 
stream, which features shifts in public opinion, priorities, and interest groups in the 
determining of actor receptiveness.  In this treatise, I look at the politics of charter 
school authorization in New York State by examining the creation and 
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responsibilities of New York State‘s multiple charter-authorizing agencies via the 
New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998.   
New York State Charter Schools 
New York was the 35
th
 state to create a law to allow for charter schools and 
was therefore able to take advantage of the ability to review what worked and failed 
in terms of charter policy across the country.  New York‘s structure features two 
statewide authorizers and allows districts to charter schools.  To best understand New 
York‘s multiple authorizing structures, it is important to examine the process that led 
to New York‘s multiple authorizing structure.  
The New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 created two statewide 
authorizers: the Board of Trustees of the State University of New York (SUNY) and 
the New York State Board of Regents.  The SUNY Trustees are appointed by the 
governor and confirmed by the New York State Senate.  The Board of Regents are 
appointed by the New York State Assembly.  The specific language and provisions of 
the act are described in further detail below, but it important to note that the law states 
that all SUNY authorizing decisions be sent to the Board of Regents for consideration 
and possible approval, whereas regents‘ decisions do not go to the SUNY Trustees for 
consideration.  Should the Board of Regents return or deny a SUNY decision, the 
SUNY Trustees have the right to resubmit the decision to the regents, and if the 
regents deny it once again or simply take no action, the decision goes into effect by 
operation of law 30 days later.  This interaction involves a great deal of behind-the-
scenes communication between the Board of Trustees of SUNY staff (The Charter 
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Schools Institute) and the State Board of Regents‘ staff (the New York State 
Education Department [NYSED]).  Given the quasigovernmental nature of both 
organizations, the open records and discourse that take place at the respective 
decision-making meetings have led to media coverage of differences in authorizing 
philosophy (Campanile, 2010).  
Given the unique arrangement of political influences behind the two 
respective entities, it is not surprising that they take different approaches to their 
responsibilities as statewide charter school authorizers.  It is noteworthy that each 
entity had a different frame of reference from which to begin this work. The SUNY 
Trustees oversee 64 colleges and universities located across New York State.  This 
work is guided by a commitment to delegate as much authority as possible to the 
campuses while rigorously holding them accountable for results.  The SUNY 
Trustees‘ involvement with kindergarten through Grade 12 (K-12) education at the 
time was via individual campus outreach to schools in their communities, based on an 
overall concern about the level of academic preparedness of students entering the 
SUNY system.  The regents oversee the University of the State of New York, as 
opposed to the State University of New York, which includes responsibility for 
prekindergarten through college (P-16) education, teacher certification, libraries, state 
archives, museums, professional licensing, vocational rehabilitation, and public 
broadcasting.  Adding charter school authorization to this list of responsibilities 
created the challenge of finding ways to continue to improve traditional K-12 
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education while simultaneously authorizing and monitoring new schools often 
designed to be different than public schools currently existing in the state.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this treatise was to serve as a case study to educate other state 
leaders and researchers as to the pros and cons of New York‘s unique policy-making 
experience in creating multiple charter-authorizing agencies. In accomplishing this 
purpose, three research questions were addressed in this study: 
1. What were processes that led to current multiple authorizing structures? 
2. How did the perspectives of the different actors influence the multiple 
authorizing structures? 
3. How do the multiple authorizing structures created in New York State in 1998 
affect the current work of charter school authorization in the state? 
Findings and recommendations produced in this study will serve not only 
authorizers and charter school leaders as they navigate their policy environments but 
also state policy makers as they attempt to implement systems called for by President 
Obama and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan to close underperforming charters 
and expand and replicate those that produce high levels of achievement for students 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009).  
Previous Focus on This Topic 
In researching this topic, I came across Hendrickson‘s (2005) dissertation, 
Greed, Vested Interests, and the Big Stick: Studying Education Policy Making in New 
York Through Charter Schools.  As the title indicates, Hendrickson used the 
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development of the New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 as a case study to 
illuminate the manner in which policy in the state is developed and passed.  He did so 
by focusing on a variety of policy frameworks, including Kingdon‘s multiple streams 
framework, the primary framework used in this study.  While I reference 
Hendrickson‘s findings, the focus of this paper is distinct.  More specifically, I looked 
more closely at the aspect of the process and outcome of multiple authorizing 
agencies existing in the state.  
Methodology 
To establish the history of the New York State policy of multiple 
authorization entities, I used qualitative methods (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), utilizing participant observation, semistructured 
interviews, and an examination of state policy artifacts to produce qualitative data. 
Data collection focused upon the perspectives of key contributors and opponents of 
the creation of New York State policy, including politicians, advocates, and 
administrators. Interviews were conducted in the fall of 2009 and data were coded for 
themes (Frechtling & Sharp, 1997; Yin, 2003). 
Interviews provided insight as to how the law that set up New York‘s system 
of charter school authorizing and the experience of authorizing entities over the last 
decade have contributed to the current state of charter schools in New York.  Specific 
interview targets included staff members of former New York State Governor George 
Pataki, who signed the New York State Charter Schools Act into law; former Board 
of Regents Chancellor and SUNY Board of Trustees Chairman Carl Hayden, who has 
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the perspective of having led both chartering entities and was Board of Regents‘ 
chancellor when the act was implemented; legislative staffers; and representatives of 
outside interest groups.  These interview subjects provided sufficient data toward 
answering the study‘s three research questions.   
Research Question 1 aimed to describe the processes that led to current 
multiple authorizing structures in New York State.  This question was best answered 
by those who originally crafted, provided input on, passed, and signed what would 
become the New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998.  In particular, I looked for 
individual roles and the chronology of events that led to the act with a specific focus 
on the formation of charter school authorizing structures. 
Research Question 2 aimed to determine how the perspectives of the different 
actors influenced the multiple authorizing structures.  This question was best 
answered by those who were directly involved in the process of bringing about the 
legislation.  In particular, I researched how political ideology might have motivated 
actions of those involved in the construction of the bill.  I explored the interview 
targets‘ preconceived notions of multiple authorizing structures as well as their 
expectations of the authorizing behaviors of the designated authorizing agencies. 
All interviews took place in May and June of 2010, some in person and some 
via phone.  Transcriptions were coded for themes and analyzed between August 2010 
and January 2011.   
Analysis of the data collected included a particular focus via Kingdon‘s 
(1995/2002) multiple streams framework.  This framework was used to examine the 
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ultimate policy decision to create multiple charter-school authorizers via the New 
York State Charter Schools Act of 1998.  By focusing on the gubernatorial 
administration of George Pataki and surrounding actors, I attempted to identify, 
analyze, and apply elements of Kingdon‘s multiple streams framework.  Kingdon 
(1995/2002) described how certain items make it to the top of the governmental 
agenda and how policy entrepreneurs, or people who are willing to invest their 
resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems, are responsible for bringing 
attention to the issues and coupling solutions to problems.  The three streams are (a) 
the problem stream, often identified via focusing events; (b) the policy stream, which 
may produce alternatives and proposals; and (c) the political stream, which features 
shifts in public opinion, priorities, and interest groups in the determining of actor 
receptiveness.  In this treatise I hypothesized that by identifying the particular 
elements of each of the three streams of Kingdon‘s framework within the key policy 
entrepreneurs backing the design of the Charter Schools Act, a better understanding 
could be reached regarding how and why the policy of multiple authorizers emerged. 
Significance of the Study 
This study expands the body of knowledge on how political forces may lead 
to charter school authorizing structures and processes.  There is a rapidly expanding 
body of knowledge and literature regarding the history and success of charter schools 
to date (Lake, 2008).  By examining the case of New York, this study provides an 




The focus of this study is the state of New York. Under New York law, 
charter schools are defined as ―independent and autonomous public schools‖ and are 
authorized by the New York Charter Schools Act of 1998 (Article 56 of the New 
York Education Law).  New York charter schools are legally organized as not-for-
profit education corporations (New York State Charter Schools Act, 1998, § 2853[1]) 
and are subject to a contractual agreement, or charter, between the school and the 
charter entity that approved its application.   
As of December 2011, there were 184 charter schools in operation, educating 
more than 64,000 students across New York State.  Of those 184 charter schools, 102 
were authorized by the Board of Trustees of SUNY (National Alliance for Public 
Charter Schools, 2011; SUNY, 2011). 
The New York State Charter Schools Act (1998) originally provided three 
routes to apply for a charter: the State University Trustees, the Board of Regents, and 
local boards of education (§ 2851[3]).  However, only the Board of Trustees of 
SUNY and the Board of Regents can approve applications statewide; local boards of 
education (and in New York City, the Chancellor) are limited to approving 
applications for charter schools within their districts‘ boundaries (New York State 
Charter Schools Act, 1998, § 2851[3][a]).   
Applications submitted to the SUNY Trustees were to be reviewed by the 
Charter Schools Institute, for which I served as executive director from August 2008 
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until November 2010, which was created by the Board of Trustees of SUNY to assist 
it in carrying out its responsibilities as a charter entity.   
The New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 authorized the creation of 
up to 50 charter schools.  Fifty of the original 50 charters were awarded to the SUNY 
Trustees and 50 more were awarded to the New York State Board of Regents and 
school districts (including the New York City Schools Chancellor).  The Charter 
Schools Act was subsequently amended, as of July 1, 2007, allowing an additional 
100 charters: 50 of the additional charters may be approved by the SUNY Trustees, 
with the remaining 50 to be approved by the Board of Regents and local school 
districts.  The 2007 amendments to the Charter Schools Act also reserve 50 of the 100 
additional charters for schools to be located in New York City.  The act was amended 
again in 2010 to raise the cap from 200 to 460 charters, allowing another even split 
between the regents and trustees.    
Delimitations 
First, authorizing is but one factor that influences the impact of charter 
schools.  In that same vein, the political forces that influence authorizers are but one 
factor in judging the impact of charter school authorizers.  
There is a plethora of data from states around the country that could also focus 
upon the political influence on such areas as public school law as a whole, charter 
school structures and operating style, and specific authorizing decisions.  In this 
treatise I did not attempt to analyze anything other than the processes that led to 
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multiple authorizing structures being a feature of the New York State Charter Schools 
Act of 1998. 
Role of Researcher 
Of the District of Columbia and the 39 states that have charter laws, no two 
have exactly the same law or method of authorizing schools. Given the fact that the 
focus of this study was New York State, the experience and perceptions of those 
interviewed in this study do not represent all states or systems of authorizing. 
In addition, I utilized purposeful selection of interview sources.  This process 
limits the application of results with respect to the perspectives of other potential 
contributors.  Still, interview sources were chosen based upon research-backed 
understanding of players involved with charter school authorizing policy since its 
inception in New York State.  Selection bias is, by definition, inherent with such a 
process.  Still, the breadth of this study and the numerous attempts to represent the 
full case of New York State effectively counteract this bias.  
The in-depth interview process also features limitations.  First, the results are 
prone to bias because an interview participant might want to ―prove‖ that a program 
or entity is or is not working and is or is not more effective than another.  Interview 
responses might therefore be biased.  This can be affected by the respondent‘s stake 
in the program or for a number of other reasons (Patton, 2002).  Interviews can also 
be time intensive because of the time it takes to conduct interviews, transcribe them, 
and analyze the results.  Another limitation of the in-depth interview is that with a 
small sample, such as in this study, results are not generalizable.  In-depth interviews 
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however, provide valuable information for programs, particularly when 
supplementing other methods of data collection (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). 
Participant Observation 
From August 2008 through November 2010, during the time of the data 
collection for this study, I served as the executive director of the SUNY Charter 
Schools Institute.  As the chief executive of one of the two statewide authorizing 
entities, I had both unique access to and knowledge of charter school authorizing in 
New York State.  As a result, I also recognize potential biases toward the practices 
and policies of the SUNY Board of Trustees.  I made every effort, however, to write 
this treatise with maximum objectivity.  
Becker and Geer (1957) asserted that the most complete form of the 
sociological datum is the form in which the participant observer gathers it: an 
observation of some social event; the events that precede and follow it; and 
explanations of its meaning by participants and spectators, before, during, and after 
its occurrence.  Such a datum gives more information about the event under study 
than data gathered by any other sociological method.  Participant observation can thus 
provide a yardstick against which to measure the completeness of data gathered in 
other ways, a model that can show what orders of information escape the researcher 
when using other methods. 
Assumptions 
This study was based on the assumption that key sources interviewed were the 
most knowledgeable, qualified people to speak to the experience of charter school 
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authorizing policy in New York State.  Furthermore, the sources who responded via 
interview were assumed to be truthful and candid in their answers.  
Summary and Organization of Remaining Chapters 
Two key pieces of information were sought in this treatise.  The first is the 
processes that led to current multiple authorizing structures in New York.  The second 
is how politics (forces, actors, and circumstance) influence outcomes (structure, 
performance).  That is, how does division of power among different actors influence 
behaviors and outcomes?  The following chapters provide further clarity regarding 
both of these questions.  
Chapter 2 examines the state of charter schools across the country and 
specifically the evolution of authorizing and the related research.  This includes a 
particular focus on the various forms of allowing multiple entities (or multiple 
authorizers) to authorize charters.  Chapter 3 describes the methodology used to 
collect and analyze the data featured in this study.  Chapter 4 is an account of the 
results of this study, focusing on key themes derived from data collection.  I describe 
why the policies were implemented the way they were in New York State, what 
makes the state‘s charter school efforts unique, and how politics (forces, actors, and 
circumstance) influenced outcomes in terms of structure and performance of charter 
school authorizing.  Finally, Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the findings, 
implications, the advantages and disadvantages of New York State‘s authorizing 
system, recommendations and conclusions, and suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2: A Review of Research and Expert Opinion on  
Multiple Authorizers of Charter Schools 
Between 2008 and 2012, featured primarily in the 2008 campaigns for the 
U.S. Presidency, national political forces have aligned as advocates for charter 
schools.  Since taking office, President Obama has further established the closure of 
underperforming charter schools and the expansion and replication of quality charter 
schools as key components of his education policy agenda via the Race to The Top 
grants program (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  At the same time, monies 
from national philanthropic foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (2010) are supporting collaborative projects between charter schools and 
traditional school districts. 
As a result of national pressure and funding, some state politicians, district 
school board, superintendents, and most teacher unions, who have long taken 
oppositional approaches to public school choice, are now reexamining their positions.  
State legislators are taking fresh looks at their charter laws.  Illinois, Indiana, 
Tennessee, and New York are among the states that have amended their laws as a 
result of the federal focus.  A key component of any charter law is the process by 
which charters are created or authorized, the focus of this treatise.  Whereas little 
research exists on the political forces and rationale that lead to authorizing entities 
existing in the forms they do from state to state, there is a great deal of literature on 
charter school legislation and the authorizing entities themselves.  Each subject is 
discussed in depth in this chapter.  The next section focuses on charter schools: their 
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history, performance, oversight policy, and legislation.  I then focus specifically on 
the subject of charter school authorizers: their types, numbers, responsibilities, 
philosophies, and other key features.  Also included is a synopsis of the research on 
multiple authorizer structures, an assessment of distinguishing characteristics of 
authorizers, and a review of New York State‘s charter authorizing structures.  Finally, 
this chapter covers Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) multiple streams framework and its 
application and limitations when applied to education policy and reform. 
Charter Schools 
Charter schools are publicly funded schools operated by independent groups 
under contract with government agencies (Hill et al., 2006; J. Nathan, 1996).  They 
are legally and fiscally autonomous entities (Mintrom & Vergari, 1997).  Individual 
schools can use different teaching methods than the surrounding public schools and 
make innovative use of time, technology, and money.  No teacher can be 
involuntarily assigned to work in a charter school, and no child can be forced to 
attend a charter school.  
At almost 20 years old, the charter school movement is still a relatively young 
experiment in education reform, and, to many, has yet to prove its value.  The 
proposition from the outset was that these schools would be granted greater autonomy 
than traditional public school districts and, in return, could innovate structural and 
instructional systems, findings from which all schools could benefit (Manno, 1998; L. 
Nathan & Myatt, 1998).  Thus far, charters have had mixed levels of success in 
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producing higher levels of student achievement (Center for Education Reform, 2010; 
Consoletti, 2011; Hoxby & Murarka, 2009; Raymond, 2010). 
It has been difficult to come to a definitive conclusion about the performance 
of the charter sector across the country, due in large part to the fact that many charter 
schools have been evaluated through alternative accountability systems with 
questionable standards and entry criteria, and different charters intend to serve very 
different sectors of students (Vanourek, 2005).  Overall effectiveness of charter 
schools relative to student growth, innovation, and efficacy has shown mixed results 
(Betts & Tang, 2008).  Complicating evaluation and outcomes further are the varied 
missions of charter schools.   
In contrast to most traditional public schools that serve all students in a 
specified geographic area, public charters are organized to serve specific groups of 
students or communities.  Studies have reported the average performance of all 
charter students as a whole tended to overlook the underlying principle that charters 
are often organized into many different forms.  Many researchers comparing charter 
schools to traditional public schools have disregarded the differences in their student 
populations and have not differentiated between types of charter schools, which often 
have fundamentally different missions, curricula, and enrollments.  Because these 
schools‘ missions differ widely, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the academic 
performance of public charter schools. 
History. The nation‘s charter school movement is now almost 20 years old, 
with over 2 million students attending over 5,000 public charter schools across the 
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country (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2011).  Paralleling this growth 
in charter school enrollment is the growing body of research on charter schools and 
their effectiveness in improving academic achievement.  Charter schools evolved 
from the public education reform movement of the 1980s and were legislated for the 
first time in 1991 in Minnesota (Laws of Minnesota, 1991).  As of 2010, there were 
40 states and the District of Columbia with charter legislation (National Alliance for 
Public Charter Schools, 2010).   
The charter school concept features several contested meanings and goals 
(Wells, Lopez, Scott, & Holme, 1999).  J. Nathan (1996) described charters as a 
structural reform effort that went beyond site-based management to create 
independent schools that confront the notion that one size fits all students.  When 
policy makers became active with the issue, market-based concepts like choice and 
competition began to dominate the discussion of charters‘ purpose (Lacireno-Paquet, 
2004; Wells, 2002).  
Intent of Charter Policy 
Legislation.  Legislators and communities enact charter school laws 
throughout the country as an effort to reform public schooling.  Charter schools aim 
to serve a variety of political and educational objectives.  The hope from those 
pushing charter policies was that autonomy and accountability would yield innovation 
and alternative systems (Manno, 1998; L. Nathan & Myatt, 1998). Other objectives of 
the creation of charter laws, depending on the state, include providing choice to 
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parents, increased competition to traditional public schools, and greater accountability 
across the public school sector (Lake, 2008; Mead & Rotherham, 2007). 
Charter school performance.  A review of the research yielded that it is still 
too early to tell how successful charters have been at accomplishing each of the above 
stated objectives.  Some studies have found that charters tend to perform similarly to 
their traditional public school counterparts in terms of mean academic achievement, 
but, by and large, charters show mixed levels of success in producing higher levels of 
student achievement (Betts & Tang, 2008; Carnoy, Jacobsen, Mishel, & Rothstein, 
2005; Center for Education Reform, 2010; Consoletti, 2011; Hill & Lake, 2005; 
Hoxby & Murarka, 2009; Miron & Nelson, 2002; Nelson, Rosenberg, & Van Meter, 
2004; Raymond, 2010; U.S. Department of Education, 2004).  
When comparing growth in achievement over time, some studies have found 
charters to outperform their counterparts (Betts & Tang, 2008; Carpenter, 2006; 
Gronberg & Jansen, 2001).  Recent evidence is also emerging that charters are 
leading to the closure of the achievement gap between students from poorer districts 
and those from more affluent communities (Hoxby & Murarka, 2009; Raymond, 
2010).  The impact of charters can also be seen at least in a limited basis anecdotally 
in the charter-like decisions being made by superintendents around the country (Lake, 
2008). 
The Raymond (2009) study proposed that charter schools do not perform as 
well as their traditional public-school peers, yielding that only 17% of charter schools 
showed growth in math scores that exceeded that of their traditional public-school 
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equivalents by a significant amount.  Charter schools in 5 of the 15 states and District 
of Columbia have significantly higher learning gains than traditional schools.  
Further, Raymond (2009) concluded that students in poverty and English-
language learners outperformed their public-school peers in both reading and math.  
However, learning gains for Black and Hispanic charter-school students were 
significantly lower than those of their traditional-school comparisons.  Ultimately, 
charters‘ performance may depend on any number of factors, including whether they 
receive as much money or support as other public schools in their communities or 
must do with less, and whether they have had enough time for teachers and 
administrators to learn to work together effectively. 
The Role of the Authorizer  
The way charters are created, or authorized, in each state is a key component 
of each distinct state‘s charter school law.  Authorizing organizations provide the 
states opportunities to ensure quality control for charters; they are the essentially the 
charter gatekeepers.  Bulkley (1999) described the role of the authorizers as important 
in the charter movement, serving as intermediaries between charter schools and the 
state policy makers who created charter school legislation. According to the National 
Association of Charter School Authorizers (2009a)
1
, the purpose of charter school 
authorizing is to improve student achievement by engaging in the ―responsible 
oversight of charter schools by ensuring that schools have both the autonomy to 
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which they are entitled and the public accountability for which they are responsible‖ 
(p. 6). 
Authorizers are charged by law to approve new schools; oversee ongoing 
performance; and evaluate the performance of public charter schools in order to make 
renewal decisions.  Most charter authorizers see their focus areas as (a) application 
collection and vetting, (b) performance contracting, (c) ongoing oversight and 
evaluation, (d) renewal decision making, and (e) agency capacity and infrastructure 
(National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2010). 
Consistent with the decentralized, state-based nature of American education 
policy, the landscape of charter authorizing structures around the country varies.  
Different types of entities are designated to serve as charter school authorizers.  There 
were 955 authorizers throughout the United States in 2010 (National Association of 
Charter School Authorizers, 2011).  Depending on state law, authorizers can be 
school districts, state education agencies, higher education institutions, independent 
chartering boards, nonprofit organizations, and mayors and municipalities.  Overall, 
80% of U.S. charter schools exist in states with multiple charter-school authorizers 
(Center for Education Reform, 2007, 2008b).  When states have single authorizers, 
those authorizers are normally local boards of education or state education 
departments. State education departments, universities, nonprofits, and school 
districts have this authorizing responsibility to varying degrees in the District of 
Columbia and the 39 states that have charter laws.   
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Differences in authorizing philosophy and practice can also be significant, 
even within the same state.  A growing body of research suggests that the state policy 
environment is crucial to the success of charter schools and charter school authorizers 
(Bierlein Palmer, 2006; Bierlein Palmer & Gau, 2003; Hassel et al., 2006).  Some 
state policies, for instance, create authorizers who more naturally tend to act more 
negatively toward charter schools than do others (Lake, 2006; Vergari, 2001).  Local 
district authorizers and state boards of education, for instance, have been consistently 
found to be among those authorizers most likely to be affected by politics (Bierlein 
Palmer, 2006; Bierlein Palmer & Gau, 2003; Gau, 2006; Hassel & Batdorff, 2004; 
Hill et al., 2001).  In both cases, decision makers may be conflicted as they oversee 
both traditional districts and charter schools.  
Research on Multiple Authorizers 
Researchers and experts have begun to report on authorizer effectiveness and 
on state policies concerning charter school authorizers (Lake, 2008; Mead & 
Rotherham, 2007).  Emerging research provides support for multiple authorizers, 
limits on the numbers of authorizers allowed, and the existence of authorizer 
oversight systems.  Other research covered in the following section offers findings on 
multiple authorizing structures as providing some relief from political pressures while 
also yielding unintended consequences. 
Recent literature on multiple authorizers. Several states recently have 
adopted or amended legislation to allow for multiple charter-school authorizers in 
recent years (Bierlein Palmer, 2006).  Three outcomes of multiple authorizing 
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structures that appear to have led to such structures being featured across the country 
are the following:  
1.  They increase the quantity of charter schools (U.S. Department of 
Education Office of Innovation and Improvement, 2007).  
2.  They protect the charter school environment from political pressures 
(National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2009; National Association 
of Charter School Authorizers, 2009b).  
3.  They allow for greater quality practice sharing throughout the state and 
sector (U.S. Department of Education Office of Innovation and 
Improvement, 2007). The next two sections outline the first two of these, 
respectively. 
Quality and quantity with multiple authorizers.  Although there is very 
little research on the issue, procharter advocates assert that allowing multiple charter-
granting entities increases the quality and quantity of charter schools.  The Center for 
Education Reform (2007), among the loudest voices in favor of multiple authorizers, 
contended that charter schools are more successful in environments that provide 
multiple avenues through which to obtain charters.  The Center for Education Reform 
(2008b) presented the case of Maryland, where charter school authorization is 
―overregulated‖ and depends too much on school board micromanagement.  Multiple 
authorizers encourage growth and activity of charter schools.   
Shober, Manna, and Witte (2006) revealed that the easier the overall charter 
application and authorization process was in a state, the more charter schools that 
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state was likely to have.  Their research did not examine, however, the reasons a state 
would have an easier application process.  It could be that states where a partial 
revision of charter school policy has occurred are more likely to have a stringent 
charter school application process, and thus have fewer charter schools, whereas 
states where charter school reform has experienced very little resistance have much 
less stringent application procedures and more charter schools. 
Although Hoxby (2004a, 2004b) did not comment on the impact of multiple 
authorizers directly, in a national study of charter school student performance she 
found states that enacted charter school legislation earlier and those in which charter 
schools were more prevalent had stronger charter school student achievement.  Hoxby 
(2004b) attributed this phenomenon to the fact that charter school legislation enacted 
toward the beginning of the charter school movement is more likely to be classified as 
―strong‖ by the Center for Education Reform.  Again, states with multiple authorizers 
tend to have more charter schools.   
Witte, Shober, and Manna (2003) provided an analysis of charter school laws 
finding that flexibility in authorization and oversight of charter schools are among the 
most important elements of charter school laws in encouraging charter school growth.  
In addition, Witte et al. found that increased flexibility in charter school laws was 
correlated with increased levels of required public accountability for charter schools.   
A recent study by CREDO (2009) found a negative impact of multiple 
authorizers on statewide charter school student performance.  Further discussion of 
 
27 
the possible meaning of these results is provided in the section on limiting the number 
of charter school authorizers.  
Checks and balances and protection from political pressure. Some 
researchers support the use of multiple authorizers as a strategy for encouraging best 
practices and protecting the charter school arena from political pressure.  In any state 
with only one charter school authorizer, there is a risk of unchecked behavior.  The 
National Association of Charter School Authorizers (2009b) has contended that the 
presence of multiple authorizers promotes professional practices among authorizers 
and provides checks and balances in charter approval, oversight, and renewal 
decisions.  Similarly, the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (2009) has 
developed a model charter school law, which encourages multiple charter-school 
authorizers as a method of ensuring that all charter school applicants have the 
opportunity to seek approval from a conscientious and well-motivated authorizer.   
A large body of research suggests that the state policy environment is crucial 
to the success of charter schools and charter school authorizers (Bierlein Palmer, 
2006; Bierlein Palmer & Gau, 2003).  Different types of charter school authorizers 
are exposed to different forms and amounts of political pressures.  Some types of 
authorizers tend to act negatively toward charter schools.  Lake (2006) explained that 
many charter schools have no option but to negotiate with an ―unfriendly‖ authorizer 
(p. 2), resulting in high oversight fees, burdensome regulations, and disadvantageous 
terms.  Several studies have found local school districts and state boards of education 
to be most susceptible to political pressures and political considerations. Vergari 
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(2001) explained that district authorizers tend to be hostile toward the charter school 
movement.  Other researchers have drawn similar conclusions about local district 
authorizers, consistently finding them to be among the most unfit of all charter school 
authorizers (Bierlein Palmer, 2006, Bierlein Palmer & Gau, 2003; Gau, 2006; Hassel 
& Batdorff, 2004; Hill et al., 2001).  Bierlein Palmer and Gau (2003) found that local 
school districts and state boards of education are more likely than any other type of 
authorizer to be affected by politics.  In addition, members of state boards of 
education tend to be from the state education department, which is bureaucratic and 
compliance driven.  These findings were confirmed by Bierlein Palmer (2006).  These 
pressures might unfairly affect the approval and oversight process for charter schools.  
In a paper on authorizer accountability, Lake (2006) offered a competing market of 
charter school authorizers as one possible option states may use for authorizer 
oversight.  The U.S. Department of Education Office of Innovation and Improvement 
(2007) recommended employing a mixture of charter school authorizers as a strategy 
for ensuring the persistence of quality authorizing in spite of political change.   
Multiple authorizers are sometimes used as a safeguard against the biases of 
the traditional educational establishment.  State education departments, 
commissioners, and boards of education tend to have a traditional focus on 
compliance (Hassel et al., 2006).  In a policy brief aimed at improving Ohio‘s charter 
schools, Bierlein Palmer et al. (2006) explained that centralized authorizer systems 
create the possibility for a sole authorizer to become a burdensome monopoly.  The 
states of Arizona and Michigan deliberately included multiple charter-school 
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authorizers in their charter school legislation in order to provide significant 
alternatives to the traditional public school system.  In fact, Arizona created separate 
charter school boards in order to distance the state‘s charter school movement from 
the state department of education (Bulkley, 1999). 
Unintended consequences of multiple authorizers.  The creation of multiple 
authorizer structures can also have unintended consequences, such as in settings 
where authorizers receive a portion of the schools‘ per-pupil revenue as opposed to, 
or in addition to, direct legislatively directed revenue; this can lead to the possible 
erosion of standards in the name of attracting charters to the portfolio (Russo, 2005; 
Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, & 
National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2006).  There is also limited 
research, such as a recent study by CREDO‘s Raymond (2009), finding a negative 
impact of multiple authorizers on statewide charter school student performance.   
Potential cause for limitations on numbers of authorizers. Raymond‘s 
(2009) finding that states featuring multiple charter-school authorizers realize 
negative student achievement results contrasted with the Center for Education 
Reform‘s (2008a) findings that ―states with multiple authorizers create the highest 
quality and quantity of charter schools‖ (p. 1).  However, it may be true that featuring 
both too many and too few authorizers produces negative results.  While advocating 
multiple authorizers, the National Association of Charter School Authorizers (2009b) 
suggested limiting the number of authorizers in any one state.  Khouri, Kleine, White, 
and Cummings (1999) cited Michigan‘s use of many charter school authorizers as a 
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reason for the problems experienced early in the state‘s charter school environment.  
While Khouri et al. agreed that the use of a sole authorizer inhibits the opening of 
charter schools, they found that Michigan‘s authorizing environment led to an overly 
complex authorization process and inadequately prepared schools.   
Size may be one factor that limits the optimal number of authorizers for a 
state.  Bierlein Palmer and Gau (2003) reported that states with fewer authorizers, 
each serving more schools, fare better than states with large numbers of authorizers.  
Similarly, Gau (2006) found that smaller authorizers are likely to practice limited 
oversight of charter schools.  Anderson and Finnigan (2001) found authorizers that 
have chartered large numbers of schools (as well as nonlocal authorizers) to be more 
likely to have well-developed accountability systems.  Several studies (Bierlein 
Palmer, 2006; Hassel & Batdorff, 2004; National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 
2009) found that more successful authorizers are those with increased access to 
resources.  The following section discusses the importance of size and resources in 
determining the success of a charter school authorizer.   
Traits of the Best Authorizers 
Researchers agree that successful charter school authorizers exhibit the 
following three traits: (a) political independence, (b) access to resources, and (c) 
desire to become an authorizer.  Both Bierlein Palmer (2006) and the National 
Alliance for Public Charter Schools (2009) have explicitly listed these three qualities 
as necessary for quality authorizers.  Other studies support some or all of these 
criteria.  The next three sections explore these traits. 
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Independence.  Independent authorizing and overseeing charter schools 
effectively requires making difficult decisions.  Some authorizers have shut down 
poorly performing charter schools in spite of opposition from parents and politicians 
(Steiner, 2009).  Likewise, authorizers often grant charters in the face of opposition 
from local school districts or teachers unions (Steiner, 2009).  Experts agree that 
successful charter school authorizers must have a degree of independence sufficient 
to isolate them from political pressure (Gau, 2006; Lake, 2006).  The Center for 
Education Reform (2007) asserted that the authorizers most likely to have high 
numbers of accountable and high-quality charter schools are those that have more 
independence from conventional education bureaucracies.  The U.S. Department of 
Education Office of Innovation and Improvement (2007) recommended that states 
take action to protect authorizers from disruptive politics.   
To that end, some states have intentionally set up and employed alternative 
independent authorizers in order to protect the charter school movement from the 
bureaucratic pressures present in the traditional public school system (National 
Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2010).  Other states have made changes to their 
charter school legislation to allow for multiple authorizers.  Colorado and Florida 
have amended their legislation to add independent charter school boards.  Authorizing 
systems in these states had previously included only local school boards and state 
education departments (Mead & Rotherham, 2007). 
Some authorizers are more susceptible to political pressures than others.  
There is some evidence that charter school authorizers who feature more 
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independence from traditional K-12 education perform better than others (Bierlein 
Palmer, 2006; Bierlein Palmer & Gau 2003).  Whereas state and local education 
boards are more susceptible to political pressure, universities and nonprofits are often 
more insulated and thus expected to base their decisions more on facts (Bierlein 
Palmer, 2006).  A study of national trends among charter authorities found that 
independent state charter boards and nonprofit organizations generally do a better job 
than other chartering entities (Gau, 2006).  Hill et al. (2001) found that new 
authorizers, authorizers who did not previously provide K-12 education directly, are 
highly concerned about learning to oversee charter schools.   
Resources.  Researchers agree that access to resources is important to an 
authorizer‘s success.  Several policy papers recommended increasing authorizer 
resources in order to improve charter schools (Bierlein Palmer et al., 2006; National 
Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2009; U.S. Department of Education Office of 
Innovation and Improvement, 2007).  In fact, the strength of Michigan authorizer 
Central Michigan University is attributed, in part, to a provision in the state‘s 
legislation allowing authorizers to collect up to 3% of a school‘s state aid (Bulkley, 
1999).  Other researchers have cited resource deficiencies as serious impediments to 
quality authorizing (Garn, 2001; Mead & Rotherham, 2007; Vergari, 2001).  
The National Association of Charter School Authorizers (2009a) has 
maintained that authorizers should be sufficiently large to maintain dedicated staff 
and adequate resources.  In a study of charter school authorizers in Arizona and 
Michigan, Bulkley (1999) found that Arizona‘s state charter school boards resorted to 
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monitoring financial accountability due to insufficient resources to monitor 
compliance.  In a later study, Bulkley (2001) found that small authorizers are less 
clear and thorough during the renewal process.  In addition, Garn (2001) found that 
authorizers with limited capacity tend to focus on approving charter schools and leave 
monitoring responsibilities to parents.  Hassel and Batdorff (2004) reported that the 
traits predicting the most capable authorizers include having large numbers of staff 
devoted to charter school oversight.   
Resources depend on the state policy environment and on the authorizer.  As 
explained above, some states allow authorizers to collect fees from schools they 
authorize.  In addition, the amount of resources available may depend on the type of 
authorizer.  Authorizers resulting from existing institutions, such as universities, may 
also have a resource advantage (Hassel et. al, 2006).  Bierlein Palmer (2006) 
identified separate state charter boards, universities, and nonprofits as having more 
ability to create infrastructure than other alternative authorizers.   
Desire.  Reluctant authorizers are often unsuccessful.  Authorizers may be 
reluctant because they oppose the charter schools they are required to sponsor, or 
because it is undesirable for that organization to authorize charter schools on top of its 
other duties (Mead & Rotherham, 2007).  Gau (2006) identified sound working 
relations between a school and its authorizer as a criterion for quality authorizing.  
Similarly, Mead and Rotherham (2007) explained that authorizers tend to do better 
when they view authorizing as an important part of their mission.  Reluctant 
authorizers are less likely to develop sound relationships with their schools.  In fact, 
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in some instances hostile chartering authorities have placed undue burdens on their 
schools (Lake, 2006).   
As mentioned above, one study (Hill et al., 2001) found that new authorizers, 
those whose only way of providing schooling is through chartering, are more likely to 
make chartering their mission.  Indeed, alternative authorizers tend to become very 
important in their states‘ charter schools movements.  Michigan‘s universities have 
taken active roles in oversight of charter schools (Bulkley, 2001).  In a report on 
quality charter school authorizing, the U.S. Department of Education Office of 
Innovation and Improvement (2007) listed two universities and several other 
alternative authorizers as examples of high-quality authorizers.   
Other notable distinguishing authorizer characteristics.  Which charter 
authorizers exhibit the traits of independence, desire, and resources is often dependent 
on a few other distinguishing authorizer characteristics.  State boards of education 
and local school districts, for instance, are less likely to have the resources, the desire, 
and the independence to become successful authorizers (Lake & Hill, 2009; Mead & 
Rotherham, 2007).  The converse is true: Chartering authorities that are new, or new 
to the K-12 education arena, tend to make better authorizers.  Each of the researchers 
found that each type of authorizer has the potential to successfully authorize and 
oversee charter schools.  In light of this, in the next three sections, I describe the 
potential benefits and limitations for small and large authorizers, local and nonlocal 
authorizers, and authorizers with and without previous direct K-12 experience.  
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Small versus large authorizers.  Small authorizers are those that authorize 
only a few schools.  Large authorizers oversee many schools.  Researchers use 
differing guidelines to distinguish between small and large charter school operators.  
For the purpose of this review, only general findings about small and large charter 
school operators are discussed.   
Mead and Rotherham (2007) described a nationwide trend whereby states are 
moving away from reliance on local district authorizers and toward ―more 
professional authorizing led by organizations that operate across an entire state or 
region, view chartering as a core part of their mission, and oversee significant 
numbers of schools‖ (p. 5).  In fact, a general consensus is that smaller chartering 
entities, such as local districts, are less effective authorizers.  An earlier section 
referenced the cases of Florida and Colorado, where charter school legislation has 
been amended to shift power from school districts to larger chartering authorities.   
Small authorizers are generally found to be less effective.  As mentioned 
above, Bierlein Palmer and Gau (2003) found that states with fewer authorizers, each 
serving more schools, do better than states with many small authorizers.  A national 
study of charter school authorizers found that smaller authorizers are more likely to 
practice limited oversight of schools (Gau, 2006).  In fact, Gau (2006) reported that 
―jumbo‖ authorizers, the largest authorizers, were most likely to have a hands-on 
approach to authorizing.  In addition, small authorizers tend to be less clear and 
thorough during the renewal process, sometimes using external accreditation 
information during the review process (Bulkley, 2001).   
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Yet, there is some evidence of ineffectiveness of larger authorizers.  For 
example, a study of authorizers in Arizona and Michigan found that Arizona‘s 
authorizers had comparatively less contact with charter schools as a result of serving 
larger numbers of charter schools (Bulkley, 1999).  However, the Arizona authorizers 
in the study faced serious resource constraints.  Thus, the limitations of large or small 
authorizers may be somewhat dependent on the authorizer‘s resources.  As discussed 
above, resources are crucial to the success of a charter school authorizer.  Large 
authorizers may be more able to devote resources solely to the task of charter school 
oversight.   
Another possibility is that experience contributes to better authorizer 
practices.  Larger authorizers naturally have more experience approving, rejecting, 
renewing, and revoking charters.  Anderson and Finnigan (2001) found that high-
volume authorizers require applicants to make more changes before granting a charter 
than do low-volume authorizers.  They theorized that this finding resulted from high-
volume authorizers having learned from their experiences and communicating their 
expectations at the beginning of their relationship with charter schools.  Similarly, 
Bulkley (2001) found that authorizers with more experience develop clearer 
guidelines for applications and the evaluation of applications.  A study of high-stakes 
decisions made by charter school authorizers found that authorizers that had made 
many high-stakes decisions in the past were more likely to be successful at 
establishing clear expectations, gathering data, and making merit-based decisions 
(Hassel & Batdorff, 2004).  
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Local versus statewide.  Local authorizers oversee only those schools that fall 
within a certain jurisdiction in the state.  Often, these authorizers are local school 
districts and municipalities, but entities such as universities serve as local authorizers 
in some states (National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2010).  Statewide 
authorizers are often state departments or boards of education or independent state 
chartering boards.  However, universities and other entities serve as statewide 
authorizers in some states.  Local authorizers tend to authorize relatively few schools.   
Some states have decided to shift chartering power away from local school 
districts.  Districts tend to be biased against charter schools and to provide them with 
less autonomy than other authorizers provide.  In a survey-based study of charter 
school authorizers, Anderson and Finnigan (2001) found that nonlocal authorizers are 
likely to have well-developed accountability systems.  A study of alternative charter 
school authorizers found municipalities, county and regional boards, and local school 
districts to be among the weaker charter school authorizers (Bierlein Palmer, 2006).  
Hassel and Batdorff (2004) recommended that policy makers provide nonlocal 
authorizer options, as local authorizers tend to be ―low-capacity‖ (p. 34).  
Many nonlocal authorizers demonstrate the three traits of successful 
authorizers.  For example Bierlein Palmer (2006) found that higher education 
institution authorizers normally display moderate desire to become authorizers and 
fairly strong political insulation and ability to create necessary infrastructure.  In the 
study, nonprofits, universities, and separate state charter boards all received 
―moderate,‖ ―fairly strong,‖ or ―strong‖ marks.  Municipalities, county and regional 
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boards, and local boards all received ―moderate,‖ ―limited,‖ and ―very limited‖ 
scores.  The only nonlocal authorizer type to receive ―limited‖ marks was state boards 
of education.   
Not all authorizers have the same rationale for sponsoring charter schools.  In 
fact, reasons for sponsoring schools differ by authorizer type.  For example, state 
authorizers were much more likely than local authorizers and universities to view 
improving the public school system, creating competition, responding to public or 
political pressure, and fulfilling the mandates of the state charter law as ―very 
important‖ in their decision to sponsor schools (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). 
 K-12 versus non-K-12 entities.  K-12 entities are those authorizers that had a 
role in providing K-12 education prior to the enactment of charter school legislation.  
In most states K-12 authorizers are local school districts and school boards and state 
education departments and boards of education.  Non-K-12 authorizers include newly 
created state chartering boards, nonprofits, universities, municipalities, and other 
entities that previously had no role or a small role in K-12 education.  
Nationwide, there is a trend toward allowing new authorizing entities into the 
charter school arena.  Several states have changed their legislation to allow for 
multiple authorizers.  In Minnesota, there are now 26 charter school authorizers, 
including the state affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers (Weber, 2011).  
In fact, the Ohio Department of Education and Arizona‘s State Board of Education no 
longer authorize charter schools, whereas states such as Ohio, Colorado, and Florida 
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have created new authorizers that are more able and willing to be quality sponsors 
(Mead & Rotherham, 2007). 
As discussed above, local districts and school boards and state education 
authorities are often found to be weaker charter school authorizers.  However, all 
chartering authorities have their strengths and weaknesses.  Existing K-12 entities 
bring the obvious benefit of experience with day-to-day school operations to the 
charter school arena.  In addition, state education authorities have the benefit of 
having experience with education statewide, as well as having additional resources 
and credibility (Hassel et al., 2006).  However, both of these entities tend to hold 
unfavorable views of charter schools (Mead & Rotherham, 2007).  In addition, 
districts and statewide education authorities tend to have a traditional focus on 
education and demand compliance as their main means of oversight.  A study by Gau 
(2006) found that 50% of state education agencies and 42% of local education 
agencies (school districts) practiced limited oversight of charter schools.   
Disadvantages of non-K-12 authorizers include lack of experience with K-12 
education and possible bias toward the charter school movement (Mead & 
Rotherham, 2007).  However, many non-K-12 entities have been found to have the 
independence, desire, and resources to become successful authorizers (see Traits of 
the Best Authorizers section above).  In addition, non-K-12 authorizers tend to 
become serious about authorizing charter schools.  For example, some university 
authorizers are pressured into becoming authorizers from a governor or legislature.  
Once involved in the process, these authorizers tend to take their responsibilities 
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seriously (Bierlein Palmer, 2006).  Similarly, Bulkley (2001) found that Central 
Michigan University began by focusing primarily on authorizing but later shifted its 
focus to accountability and oversight.  Hill et al. (2001) found that newer authorizers 
tend to be more concerned with learning to oversee schools.   
Despite the obvious benefits and disadvantages of each authorizer type, 
relevant literature consistently remarks that all chartering entities have the potential to 
be good authorizers.  Each authorizer type brings unique advantages to the charter 
school arena.  A study by Ascher et al. (2003) found that, in spite of differences in the 
application, approval, and oversight processes, each authorizer in New York State had 
developed an accountability system superior to that used for traditional public 
schools.  Ascher et al. concluded, ―Student performance appears to be the critical 
endpoint for all three authorizers‖ (p. 32). 
To summarize the conclusions of many studies of charter school authorizers, 
there is no one best authorizer or one best mix.  The states range greatly in the 
numbers and types of charter school authorizers they allow.  When states have single 
authorizers, those authorizers are normally local boards of education or state 
education departments.  States choose mixes of authorizers that uniquely fit their 
needs.  Vergari (2001) explained that charter schools exist along a continuum of 
autonomy that differs from state to state.  For example, Arizona, a largely 
conservative state, chose to emphasize the values of efficiency and choice in its 
charter school legislation.  Thus, the state allows for a large number and variety of 
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charter school authorizers (Garn, 2000).  Conversely, the State Board of Education is 
the sole authorizer of charter schools for Massachusetts (Vergari, 2000).  
Oversight of Authorizers 
One common theme of research on charter school authorizers is that 
authorizer oversight is necessary.  Experts of varying opinions have recommended 
that states institute systems for authorizer oversight.  These recommendations include 
third-party reviews, state oversight, and authorizer report-card systems (Center for 
Education Reform, 2007; CREDO, 2009; Hill et al., 2001; Lake, 2006; National 
Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2009; U.S. Department of Education Office of 
Innovation and Improvement, 2007). 
Along with suggesting that states use multiple authorizers, Lake (2006) 
encouraged third-party reviews.  Model laws created by the Center for Education 
Reform (2008b) and the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (2009) include 
the creation of charter school authorizer oversight bodies.  Oversight mechanisms 
have notably increased standards of authorizing in several states.  For example, 
Central Michigan University and Arizona‘s State Board for Charter Schools have 
both improved in response to state audits finding deficiencies in their practices (Mead 
& Rotherham, 2007).   
Lake (2006) discussed, among other strategies, using an authorizer report card 
system to hold authorizers accountable.  Benefits of such a system would include 
giving policy makers the information they need to make decisions about whether to 
develop oversight systems for their authorizers without mandating that states with 
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unique situations to do so.  The system also might apply the public accountability 
mechanisms of the charter school movement to authorizers; prospective charter 
schools might not seek out an authorizer with consistently bad ratings.   
However, it is important that these oversight processes strike an appropriate 
balance between providing rules and providing autonomy.  Lake (2004) pointed out 
that New York‘s charter school authorizers operate in a ―burdensome regulatory 
environment‖ (p. 15). The U.S. Department of Education Office of Innovation and 
Improvement (2007) recommended that, in cases of joint oversight of charter schools 
by authorizers and other entities, states foster a streamlined relationship that 
maximizes efficiency and minimizes administrative burdens on charter schools. 
Rationale for Multiple Authorizer Systems Across States 
One study compared the political construction of charter schools in Arizona, 
Michigan, and Georgia.  Bulkley (2005) found differences among the states in terms 
of the political environments in which charter school legislation achieved passage, 
how each state‘s educational problem was defined, and each state‘s theory of how 
charter schools would fix or at least aid in fixing that problem.  Charter school 
advocates in Arizona believed that the introduction of charter school legislation 
allowing for multiple sponsors and authorizers, choice, and deregulation would have 
effects at both the school and system levels.  At the school level, they believed the 
new reform ultimately would result in charter schools with improved student 
outcomes, which were more efficient and responsive to parents.  At the system level, 
advocates believed that allowing multiple authorizers would result in a large number 
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of charter schools, taking students away from traditional public schools, forcing 
traditional public schools to improve student outcomes and become more responsive 
to parents. 
Like Arizona, Michigan‘s charter school advocates believed that at the system 
level, multiple sponsors of charter schools would result in many charter schools 
taking students away from traditional public schools and forcing traditional public 
schools to improve and compete with charter schools for students (Bulkley, 2005).  
At the school level, advocates believed that allowing multiple charter-school 
authorizers in the state would contribute to greater school autonomy and more of a 
focus on student outcomes than if local school boards were the only potential 
authorizers.  Also, charter advocates believed that charter schools that were able to 
overcome all of the obstacles of starting a school from scratch would produce higher 
levels of achievement. 
Multiple Authorizers in New York State 
The law that established New York‘s authorizing entities, the New York State 
Charter Schools Act of 1998, created two state-wide authorizers: the SUNY Board of 
Trustees and the New York State Board of Regents.  School districts were also 
designated as charter entities for their specific geographic regions. The SUNY 
Trustees are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate.  The regents are 
appointed by the New York State Assembly.  The specific language and provisions of 
the act are described in further detail below, but it is important to note that the law 
states that all SUNY authorizing decisions be sent to the regents for consideration and 
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possible approval, whereas regents‘ decisions do not go to the SUNY Trustees for 
consideration.  Should the regents return or deny a SUNY decision, the SUNY 
Trustees have the right to resubmit the decision to the regents, and if the regents deny 
it once again or simply take no action, the decision goes into effect by operation of 
law 30 days later.  This interaction involves a great deal of behind-the-scenes 
communication between the SUNY Trustees‘ staff (The Charter Schools Institute
2
) 
and the regents‘ staff (NYSED).  Given the quasigovernmental nature of both 
organizations, the open records and discourse that take place at the respective 
decision-making meetings tend to lead to media coverage of differences in 
authorizing philosophy.  
Given the traditionally unique political influence behind the two entities, it is 
not surprising that they take different approaches to their responsibilities as statewide 
charter school authorizers.  It is perhaps noteworthy, however, that each entity had a 
different frame of reference from which to begin this work.  The SUNY Trustees 
oversee 64 colleges and universities located across New York.  This work is guided 
by a commitment to delegate as much authority as possible to the campuses while 
rigorously holding them accountable for results.  The SUNY Trustees‘ involvement 
with K-12 education at the time was via individual campus outreach to schools in 
their communities based on an overall concern about the level of academic 
preparedness of students entering the SUNY system.  The Board of Regents oversees 
                                                 
2
 Disclosure: I was the executive director of the SUNY Charter Schools Institute between 2008 and 
2010 when much of this research was conducted. 
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the University of the State of New York, which includes responsibility for P-16 
education, teacher certification, libraries, state archives, museums, professional 
licensing, vocational rehabilitation, and public broadcasting.   
The use of multiple authorizing entities is but one feature of the New York 
State Charter Schools Act of 1998.  The overall push was ―to change from rule-based 
to performance-based accountability systems‖ (Ascher et al., 2003, p. 3).  That is, in 
exchange for decreasing the regulations under which schools operate, these schools 
are to meet their student achievement promises, as indicated by scores on 
standardized tests mandated by the New York State Board of Regents for all public 
schools (Ascher et al., 2003).  ―[To] ensure that the charter school is in compliance 
with all applicable laws, regulations and charter provisions,‖ each authorizer is 
empowered by law to ―visit, examine into and inspect any charter school, including 
the records of such school, under its oversight‖ (New York State Charter Schools Act, 
1998, § 2853).  Although charter schools operate outside school districts, the districts 
in which charter schools are geographically located also have the right to visit, 
examine into, and inspect the schools to ensure that they are in compliance with all 
applicable laws, regulations, and charter provisions. In other words, in the context of 
a performance-based accountability system, charter schools in New York still operate 
under some of the regulatory accountability experienced by traditional public schools. 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework 
Because authorizing is a high-impact piece of any charter school policy, it is 
important to expand research on charter schools to include more detailed analysis of 
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multiple authorizing structures.  As noted above, there is a dearth of research on why 
states have designed their authorizing structures the way they have or the political 
forces and processes behind such decisions.  Given its widely referenced application 
to public policy making, Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) multiple streams framework for 
policy making is a particularly useful method to examine the emergence of the New 
York State Charter Schools Act and its unique multiple authorizing design.  In the 
section to follow, I describe Kingdon‘s multiple streams framework, its defining 
features, and ways it has been applied to education reform in previous studies.  
Focusing on why and how policy agendas are created is critically important.  
Kingdon (1984, 1995/2002) defined the agenda as either a government agenda, a list 
of subjects that officials are paying serious attention to at any given time, or decision 
agendas, which are short lists of those subjects from the government agenda that have 
survived competition and are moving into position for some definitive decision. The 
term agenda was described by Kingdon (1984) as the ―list of subjects or problems to 
which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated 
with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time‖ (p. 3). 
Using Kingdon to identify how agendas are set is particularly useful, 
according to Lieberman (2002):  
Applying this framework to policy making is significant for two reasons.  
First, policy makers, educators, interest groups, students of education policy, 
and so forth can gain pertinent information on the impact of agenda setting 
and policy formulation on the education system.  Second, this analysis can 
help public policy analysts and students, in all specialty areas, gain a better 
understanding of agenda setting and policy formulation at the state and local 
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level.  In addition, it will allow students to gain a firmer grasp on the 
integration of theory into practice. 
As Lieberman indicated, Kingdon‘s work provides a useful framework that describes 
how certain items make it to the top of the governmental agenda.  Kingdon‘s original 
multiple streams framework came from a study in which he focused on health care 
policies as enacted at the federal level; the framework is most often applied as such 
(Hinz 2010; Kingdon, 1995/2002; Smart, 2008).  
In this framework, Kingdon (1995/2002) laid out a four-step model of the 
policy-making process: ―(1) the setting of the agenda, (2) the specification of 
alternatives from which a choice is to be made, (3) an authoritative choice among 
those specified alternatives, and (4) the implementation of the decision‖ (p. 3).  
Kingdon (1995/2002) focused his study on understanding the first two steps in the 
process by answering these questions: (a) How do subjects come to officials‘ 
attention; (b) what makes people in and around government attend, at any given time, 
to some subjects and not to others; (c) how are the alternatives from which they 
choose generated; and, perhaps most important, (d) ―why does an idea‘s time come 
when it does?‖ (p. xi). According to Kingdon (1995/2002), ―Windows open in policy 
systems. These policy windows, the opportunities for action on given initiatives, 
present themselves and stay open for only short periods‖ (p. 166).  His conclusion 
was that policy making is a process with three distinct streams: (a) the problem 
stream, often identified via focusing events; (b) the policy stream, which may produce 
alternatives and proposals; and (c) the political stream, which features shifts in public 
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opinion, priorities, and interest groups in the determining of actor receptiveness 
(Kingdon, 1995/2002; Lieberman, 2002).  Whereas this framework is applied across 
the spectrum of public policy making, in the next sections I describe the framework 
through examples of how it has been applied to education policy reform (Kingdon 
1995/2002; Malen, 2003).  Each of these streams is discussed in greater depth.  
Problem stream.  Problems comprise the first of Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) 
streams.  This stream identifies why some issues are recognized as significant 
problems instead of others.  With his framework, Kingdon (1995/2002) argued that 
the answer is derived from the process by which individuals learn about conditions 
and the way these conditions are defined as problems.  Sometimes attention to a 
problem is influenced by a more or less systematic indicator of a problem, whereas at 
other times it is impacted by a dramatic event that seizes individuals‘ attention or 
feedback from the operation of an existing program (Kingdon, 1995/2002). In short, 
agenda setting takes place based upon the identification of problems through the 
identification of indicators like dramatic events, symbols, and feedback from existing 
programs (Mulholland & Shakespeare, 2005). 
Problems often get attention when a focusing event, such as a crisis or disaster 
event, occurs (Kingdon, 1995/2002).  Kingdon (1995/2002) also described these 
events as coming along ―to call attention to the problem, a powerful symbol that 
catches on‖ (pp. 94-95).  In ―The Case for Choice,‖ Fusarelli (2001) applied this 
concept to the key point of the evolution of the charter law in Michigan being an audit 
conducted at the state‘s largest authorizer.   
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Another variation on the focusing event is the emergence and circulation of a 
powerful symbol.  A symbol could be the passage of a significant piece of legislation.  
For example, the passage of California‘s Proposition 209, the legislation that 
outlawed affirmative action for women and minorities, although enacted in one state, 
was felt around the entire higher education community (Mulholland & Shakespeare, 
2005).  Another example is the National Commission on Excellence in Education‘s 
(1983) publication, A Nation At Risk, which identified a crisis in the American public 
education system.  
Although a number of problems may be identified, only a very small 
percentage of them become agenda items.  Those that become agenda items do so 
either because they are brought to the attention of officials or because they become 
perceived as a problem when they had not been so before (Lieberman, 2002).  Policy 
entrepreneurs, described in the context of the policy stream, are responsible for 
bringing attention to the issues and coupling solutions to problems, taking advantage 
of the focusing event.   
Policy stream.  The second stream contains policies and includes a wide 
variety of ideas floating around in what Kingdon (1984) called a ―policy primeval 
soup‖ (p. 123).  The ideas that are floated around are generated by specialists, who 
include individuals in a given policy area in and outside of government.  These ideas 
are subject to competitive selection where some ideas survive, others are combined 
into new proposals, and others are discarded.   
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Specialists may be part of different groups or constituencies, but they have in 
common a concern for one area of policy problems.  The ideas that are proposed are 
tried out in various ways, with some remaining the same, others combined into new 
proposals, and others disappearing.  Although a large number of ideas float around, 
only a few ever receive serious consideration.  Selection criteria for ideas include 
technical feasibility and value acceptability.  Proposals that are or appear to be 
difficult to implement or do not conform to the values of policy makers are less likely 
to be considered or adoption (Zahariadis, 1999). 
Kingdon (1984) maintained that the policy stream is dependent on a group of 
hidden participants, or a community, consisting of specialists in government, 
academics, and special interest groups.  They generally take responsibility for 
proposing solutions to various societal conditions under debate once an item has been 
elevated to an agenda item. 
Much as molecules floated around in what biologists call the ―primeval soup‖ 
before life came into being, so ideas float around in these [policy] 
communities.  …While many ideas float around in this policy primeval soup, 
the ones that last, as in a natural selection system, meet some criteria.  Some 
ideas survive and prosper; some proposals are taken more seriously than 
others. (Kingdon, 1984, p. 123) 
For an issue to rise to the top of an agenda, the policy and problem streams 
must join together at critical moments in time.  Kingdon (1995/2002) labeled these 
moments as ―policy windows‖ (p. 203) and argued that they present unique 
opportunities for advocates to gain attention to their problems.  These moments can 
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occur predictably or unpredictably and are called windows because they are only of a 
short duration.  
When the policy window is open, policy entrepreneurs must seize the 
opportunity and initiate action.  In this way, policy entrepreneurs are key individuals 
because they couple streams (Mulholland & Shakespeare, 2005).  Kingdon 
(1995/2002) asserted that the policy-making arena is characterized by these reform 
advocates who develop detailed proposals or ―solutions‖ and then search for 
problems on which to attach their proposals.  He and other theorists refer to these 
people as policy entrepreneurs.   
Policy entrepreneurs ―advocate for proposals‖ and their defining 
characteristic, ―much in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to 
invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope 
of a future return‖ (Zahariadis, 1999, p. 129).  These entrepreneurs advocate to 
promote their personal interests, solve a problem, and shape public policy according 
to their values.  Policy entrepreneurs must not only be persistent but also skilled at 
coupling—able to attach problems to solutions and find individuals receptive to their 
ideas (Mulholland & Shakespeare, 2005; Zahariadis, 1999). 
In the case of education, there are many policy entrepreneurs pitching any 
number of proposed solutions.  However, Mintrom and Vergari (1996) argued that the 
problems in public education have yet to be carefully identified and acknowledged 
due to it being so much easier to provide solutions than examine problems.  
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 Policy entrepreneurs frequently define policy problems in ways that both 
attract the attention of decision makers and indicate appropriate policy responses 
(Kingdon, 1995/2002; Majone, 1988; Polsby, 1984).  In seeking support for their 
policy ideas, policy entrepreneurs face choices about which issues to push and how to 
push them.  Thus, arguments in support of the policy idea sometimes have to be 
crafted in different ways for different audiences.  How well this is done will prove 
critical for how the policy debate unfolds (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).  Kingdon 
(1984) described policy entrepreneurs as tending to 
lie in wait in and around government with their solutions (already) in hand, 
waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions, 
waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their 
advantage. (pp. 165-166) 
 Finally, policy entrepreneurs frequently seek to assemble and maintain 
coalitions to support specific policy ideas (Eyestone, 1978).  Again, these can prove 
to be valuable political resources during discussions of policy change (Lieberman, 
2002; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). 
Political stream.  The political stream is arguably the most critical avenue 
toward placing an item on the agenda.  According to Kingdon (1995/2002), 
politicians set the agenda.  Specialists may sort out which policy alternatives a 
proposal might contain, yet an issue‘s placement on the agenda is ultimately 
determined by elected officials.  Changes in interest group pressure, swings in the 
national mood, and elections that bring new administrations to power are some of the 
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factors that define the political stream (Kingdon, 1995/2002; Lieberman, 2002).  
Descriptions of these three factors follow. 
National mood.  The national mood refers to the idea that fairly large numbers 
of individuals in a given country are thinking along certain common lines.  This 
national mood can change in discernible ways, which can have important impacts on 
policy agendas and policy outcomes (Kingdon, 1984).  The national mood can create 
the ―fertile ground‖ (Kingdon, 1984, p. 153) for a policy‘s promotion or can slow 
down a policy.  Politicians and decision makers can gain a sense of the national mood 
through a variety of ways, from communication with community members to 
discussions with other decision makers.  Either way, national moods must be given 
attention because they often dictate what happens to policies.  In this study, I am 
adapting the concept of national model to the state level.  Examples of studies 
applying Kingdon‘s multiple streams framework to state-level education policy 
include Young, Shepley, and Song (2010) and Kelly (2005). 
Pressure group campaigns.  When an issue is supported or leaders lean in 
favor of an issue, it pushes the issue and can cause it to become more prominent on 
the agenda, and vice versa.  If all interest groups are voicing their support for a 
proposed issue, the item is more likely to reach the agenda faster than an issue with 
conflicting views.  Often, the determining factor in a policy‘s survival or downfall is 
who is on which side and who is the most adamant about a position on the issue.  
Although the determination of the balance and support of issues is somewhat 
imprecise, it is possible to determine who is on which side and which side has greater 
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strength (Kingdon, 1995/2002).  One example is governmental programs that have 
groups of supporters who will defend them.  Politicians must consider the 
consequences they would face if they wish to go against a powerful interest group.  
Legislative turnover and elections.  In addition to changes in national mood 
and the balance of organized political forces, the composition of individuals within 
government is the third major component of the political stream.  Although Kingdon 
(1984) wrote of government officials, the concepts can be applied to understanding 
the turnover of key personnel in the education environment.  The turnover of key 
decision makers produces new agenda items and makes it difficult to consider items 
that might have previously been on the agenda.  One of the most powerful turnover 
effects is a change of administration.  ―At the time of a change of administration, 
people all over town hold their breath in anticipation, waiting to see what the new 
administration‘s priorities will be, what its policy agendas will look like‖ (Kingdon, 
1984, p. 161). 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework’s Application to Education Reform 
Policy 
An examination of the research on policy reform yields a number of examples 
of Kingdon‘s multiple streams framework being specifically applied to education 
policy reform.  A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 
1983) defined the problem of the crisis in American public education, suggested 
solutions, and captured the nation‘s political attention. 
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Mintrom and Vergari (1996) also focused on the problem of widespread 
concern over public education in the United States.  Their article developed a 
conceptual framework for analyzing education reform and accountability issues in an 
intergovernmental context.  The writers identified and discussed common themes in 
five prominent education reform efforts in the United States: (a) the emergence of 
specific goals and requirements for public schools, (b) the introduction of open-
enrollment plans, (c) the establishment of charter schools, (d) the encouragement of 
private contracting for the delivery of school services, and (e) the development of 
public and private voucher programs.  While diverse, each of these efforts involves a 
deliberate attempt to change the accountability mechanisms in the delivery of 
education, and all have been affected by intergovernmental politics. 
Mintrom and Vergari (2007) later used Kingdon to interpret the background to 
and dynamics of recent education policy reform in Michigan.  Rice and Malen (2003) 
applied Kingdon to what at the time was a prevalent but under-examined policy 
option of school reconstitution.  
In a slight variation on Kingdon‘s framework, studying the evolution of state 
education policies in Minnesota, Mazzoni (1993) described the influence of 
relationships among key actors, which in turn demands decisions via individuals and 
coalitions.  Mazzoni wrote more of the characteristics of the policy system 
determining the play of power around the issues that receive agenda status.  He 
argued that the identification of system characteristics offers only a partial 
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explanation of policy-making processes, the other elements being the particular 
policy at stake, the structure of the system, and its environmental context. 
Fusarelli (2001) applied the Kingdon concept of focusing events like crises or 
disasters that come along to call attention to the problem.  Fusarelli specifically 
applied the concept to the key point of the evolution of the charter law in Michigan 
being an audit conducted at the state‘s largest authorizer.  Hinz (2010) used Kingdon 
to describe why the reforms in Australia succeeded in the early 1990s (when the 
school policy sphere was characterized by a coordinate model of federalism and loose 
Commonwealth conditions and oversight) and might not succeed today, given the 
extension of intergovernmental and national agreements on schooling and increase in 
scope and complexity Commonwealth school policy and tied grants. 
In ―The Politics of Charter Schools,‖ Vergari (2007) used Kingdon‘s policy 
streams model to demonstrate how the new ideas in the form of charter school politics 
took hold around the country and how major policy changes materialized.  Vergari 
(2007) focused specifically on Kingdon‘s notion of the relationships between 
coalitions and past policy precedent.  Vergari (2007) applied a piece of Kingdon‘s 
framework in showing how when an old coalition that was blocking a reform is 
defeated, ―life is never quite the same‖ (Kingdon, 1995/2002, p. 191) because the 




Mintrom (1997) referenced Kingdon in examining advances in school choice 
legislation.  Mintrom took Kingdon‘s concept of policy entrepreneurs further, 
defining them as people who seek dynamic policy change:  
They constitute a class of political actors who, like their business counterparts, 
are identifiable by the types of actions they engage in, rather than their 
specific location.  When successful, policy entrepreneurs can have a 
destabilizing effect.  That is, their actions often force other people to make 
adjustments from their comfortable positions.  To overcome resistance to 
change, policy entrepreneurs must be skilled political actors.  They must often 
reframe issues and construct arguments in order to maximize the chances that 
they can sell their ideas to others. (p. 44) 
Kingdon (1995/2002) and Mintrom both described key activities of policy 
entrepreneurs as engaging in significant amounts of networking in and around 
government and providing high-quality information to decision makers.  They need to 
convince politicians to overcome their risk-averse nature. 
More recently, Young et al. (2010) applied Kingdon‘s multiple streams model 
to explain how the issue of reading became prominent on the agenda of state 
governments during the latter half of the 1990s.  Their findings suggested that the 
applicability of Kingdon‘s national-level model to the state level may depend on both 
the issue being examined and the participation of the state executive branch. 
Limitations of Applying Kingdon to Education Reform Policy 
While I believe, for the reasons stated above and what follows in Chapters 3 
and 5, that there is direct application of the Kingdon multiple streams framework to 
the examination of the multiple authorizing structures created via the New York State 
Charter Schools Act of 1998, there are a number of limitations and criticisms to 
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consider, as well.  The first of these is the fact that Kingdon‘s original multiple 
streams framework was developed in 1984, and a number of theorists have utilized 
and built upon this original work.  Few have done so at the state level regarding 
education policy. Young et al. (2010) described how researchers have used Kingdon‘s 
multiple streams framework to explain state-level educational policy process for a 
wide range of issues as well as several policy contexts.  These include state 
decentralization of higher education (McLendon, 2003), teacher tenure in Colorado 
(Elrod, 1994), diversity in Minnesota (Stout & Stevens, 2000), gifted education in 
New Mexico (Holderness, 1992), and school reforms in Chicago (Lieberman, 2002) 
and Ohio (Edlefson, 1993).   
Next, there is an argument that the three streams of problems, policies, and 
politics may be more interdependent than independent.  Kingdon (1984) described the 
streams as each having a life of its own, with its own rules and dynamics; the streams 
interact only during open windows when policy entrepreneurs intervene.  However, 
critics disagree with this conception of independent streams.  Mucciaroni (1992) 
contended that a more proper description of the streams is interdependent, which 
allows for an understanding of how one stream can trigger or reinforce changes in 
another.  Although there is no definite answer of whether the streams should be 
viewed as independent or interdependent, Mucciaroni‘s critique pointed to a need to 




The last concern is that the multiple streams framework, while certainly 
helpful in explaining in how policies are made, does not do well to predict future 
policies.  Because of this, critics have argued that the multiple streams framework is 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
The first two chapters of this treatise provided the historical and theoretical 
context for charter school authorizing policy.  The preceding chapters described the 
state of charter schools and charter school authorizing, as well as a description of the 
application of Kingdon‘s (1984, 1995/2002) multiple streams framework to education 
reform efforts.  What is left unclear is how political forces lead to multiple 
authorizing structures and outcomes.  The purpose of this chapter is to define the 
research design, methodology, procedures, and analysis used to provide insight to this 
end by accomplishing the following purpose and answering key research questions.  
First, I explain my rationale for using an exploratory, qualitative, case study design.  
Then, I describe the participants and the criteria I employed for selecting them.  Next, 
I discuss my procedures for data collection and analysis. Finally, I discuss validity 
threats to my study and how I attended to them. 
Restatement of Purpose 
This treatise covers one state‘s efforts to grapple with the political realities of 
authorizing charter schools and serves as a case study to educate policy makers of 
other states as to pros and cons of New York‘s unique experience.  Consequently, the 
goal was to examine the creation of New York State‘s multiple charter-authorizing 
agencies.  In accomplishing this purpose, the following research questions were 
addressed in this study: 
1. What were processes that led to current multiple authorizing structures? 
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2. How did the perspectives of the different actors influence the multiple 
authorizing structures? 
3. How do the multiple authorizing structures created in New York State in 
1998 affect the current work of charter school authorization in the state? 
Findings and recommendations produced in this study serve not only authorizers and 
charter schools as they navigate their policy environments but also state policy 
makers as they attempt to implement systems called for by President Obama and 
Secretary of Education Duncan to close underperforming charters and expand and 
replicate those that produce high levels of achievement for students.  
Overview of Methodology 
To establish the history of the New York State policy of multiple 
authorization entities, I used qualitative methods (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), utilizing participant observation, semistructured 
interviews, and an examination of state policy artifacts to produce qualitative data.  
Data collection focused upon the perspectives of key contributors and opponents of 
the creation of New York State policy, including politicians, advocates, and 
administrators.  Interviews were conducted in Spring 2010 and coded for themes 
(Frechtling & Sharp, 1997; Yin, 2003). 
Rationale for Qualitative Methodology 
In my study, I employed a qualitative methodology because I was interested in 
understanding the meaning that interview participants made of their experiences with 
the creation of the multiple authorizing structures within the New York State Charter 
 
62 
Schools Act (Maxwell, 2005; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2003).  A qualitative research 
design was preferable in this case because I explored what was going on (Maxwell, 
2005) within the context in which policymakers made decisions about this issue 
(Stake, 1995).  Furthermore, I sought to understand the process that led to the law 
(Maxwell, 2005; Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003).  Creswell‘s (1998) 
definition of qualitative research underscores its relevance for my particular treatise 
research: 
Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct 
methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem.  
The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports 
detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting. (p. 
15) 
 Specifically, I used a case study approach for this qualitative study as I sought 
to examine multiple perspectives of the creation of the law.  Each participant 
experienced the same phenomenon—the creation of multiple authorizing structures 
via the New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998.  In the next section, I review 
why the case study was an appropriate approach. 
The case study approach.  Yin (2003) advocated the case study as a research 
strategy when ―how‖ or ―why‖ questions are posed (p. 1).  In this study I sought to 
understand how the interview participants described and understood the process of 
the creation of multiple authorizing structures via the Charter Schools Act. 
Additionally, case studies should be used when seeking to understand complex social 
phenomena (Stake, 1995), such as charter school policy.  Finally, the case study 
method is used when contextual conditions are an essential component of the 
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phenomenon under study (Yin, 2003).  In my study, I sought to understand my 
participants‘ perspectives in various contextual conditions.  This study differs from 
interview studies because each of the interviewees‘ experiences with the eventual 
implementation of the New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 represents 
distinct viewpoints of one phenomenon. 
In the next section, I explain my approach to triangulating data and then lay 
out my criteria for methodological decisions about participant selection.  As described 
above, by employing a qualitative methodological approach, I purposefully selected 
the participants (Maxwell, 2005; Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
 Triangulation. The use of interviews of multiple key actors and decision 
makers, artifacts, and previous publications on the topic resulted in discrete but 
interrelated sets of data. This served to increase the study‘s authenticity and to 
provide added depth to the investigation.  This form of triangulation, referred to by 
Denzin (1978) as data triangulation, was a means by which weaknesses of one data 
set could be compensated by the strengths of another (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; 
Denzin, 1978; Patton, 2002). 
Interviews 
 Whereas my research questions represented what I sought to understand, my 
interview questions were what I actually asked the participants in order to gain that 
understanding (Maxwell, 2005).  However, interview questions helped to address the 
research questions.  The interviews allowed me to explore how the participants 
described and understood the process of the creating a multiple authorizer system via 
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the New York State Charter Schools Act. According to Seidman (2006), if the goal 
―is to understand the meaning people involved in education make of their experience, 
then interviewing provides a necessary, if not always completely sufficient, avenue of 
inquiry‖ (p. 11).  
 According to Marshall and Rossman (1995), typically, qualitative in-depth 
interviews are much more like conversations than formal events with predetermined 
response categories.  The researcher explores a few general topics to help uncover the 
participant‘s perspective but otherwise respects how the participant frames and 
structures responses—the participant‘s perspective on the phenomenon of interest 
should unfold as the participant views it, not as the researcher views it.  ―In that vein, 
the process of interviewing is one of the most important data-gathering sources in 
case study research‖ (Linares, 1997, p. 57). 
The nature of a qualitative methodology allows the researcher to select a 
purposeful sample in which particular ―persons…are selected deliberately in order to 
provide information that cannot be gotten as well from others‖ (Maxwell, 2005, p. 
70).  In this study, interviews provided insight as to how the law that set up New 
York‘s system of charter school authorizing and the experience of authorizing entities 
over the last decade led to the current state of charter schools in New York.  Specific 
interview targets included (a) former Governor George Pataki, who signed the act 
into law; (b) former Board of Regents Chancellor and current SUNY Board of 
Trustees Chairman Carl Hayden, who has the perspective of having led both 
chartering entities and was Board of Regents‘ Chancellor when the act was 
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implemented; (c) Robert Bellafiore and Peter Murphy, staffers with Governor Pataki 
who worked on the act; (d) Tom Carroll of the Brighter Choice Foundation and Brian 
Backstrom, both of whom worked on an issue-related think tank; (e) Director of 
Government Relations for the New York State United Teachers Union Alan Lubin, 
who advocated against the act; (f) former Assemblyman John Faso, who authored an 
unsuccessful bill that is thought to be an important precursor to the Charter Schools 
Act; and (g) Jeff Lovell, chief negotiator for the New York State Assembly.  Former 
Governor George Pataki, who signed the bill into law; Rudy Crew, the chancellor of 
the New York City Department of Education at the time of the law‘s passage; Jeff 
Lovell; and Richard Platkin, the lead counsel on the bill, all declined to be 




Position in 1998, the time of the New York 
State Charter Schools Act 
Carl Hayden Chancellor of the New York State Regents 
John Faso  Assemblyman (R) 
Alan Lubin New York State United Teachers Union 
Tom Carroll Change New York 
Peter Murphy  Executive staff 
Brian Backstrom Change New York 
Robert Bellafiore Staff, Governor George Pataki 
 
The interview subjects were chosen with the understanding that they would 
provide sufficient data toward answering the study‘s three research questions as noted 
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in Table 2.  There did not appear to be other more knowledgeable participants in the 
creation of the act or others who might add significantly different perspective of the 
events.    
Table 2 
Interview Protocol and Relation to Research Questions 
Research question Interview protocol questions 
Research Question 1: 
What were forces that 
led to current 
multiple authorizing 
structures? 
1. What was your job/role at the time of the creation and 
enactme‘2nt of the Charter Schools Act? 
2. Please take me through the process that led to the New 
York State Charter Schools Act. 
3. Why were charter schools on the agenda to begin with? 
4. Who wanted charters in New York State and why? 
5. What kind of research and policy vetting was done, if any? 
6. What were the most critical junctures of the process of 
enacting the Charter Schools Act? 
7. To whom were charters desirable?  What problems were 
you trying to solve? 
8. What were the key objectives sought from the Charter 
Schools Act? 
9. Why did the Charter Schools Act ultimately pass and 
become law? 
 
Research Question 2: 
How did the 
perspectives of the 
different actors 
influence the multiple 
authorizing 
structures? 
10. Why was the act ultimately passed and signed? 
11. Did political philosophy impact the process and/or 
outcome of the Charter Schools Act?  If so, how? 
12. Why did the policymakers/you ultimately decide to split 
the authorizing duties between State University of New 
York Trustees and the Regents? 
13. Were your expectations of the two authorizers different? 
Why? 
14. What were your expectations of what good authorizing 
looked like? 




Interview structure.  Per Mertens (2005), a semistructured protocol was 
utilized. Each interview was roughly an hour in length and conducted either in 
person, when possible, or via phone.  
Interview objectives.  In answering Research Question 1, I aimed to describe 
the forces that led to current multiple authorizing structures in New York State.  This 
question was best answered by those who originally crafted, provided input on, 
passed, and signed what would become the New York State Charter Schools Act of 
1998.  Interview targets included Murphy and Bellafiore, who worked for Governor 
George Pataki; Assemblyman Faso, who filed an initial unsuccessful charter schools 
bill; Carroll and Backstrom, who worked on education policy for a local think tank, 
and Lubin, from the New York State United Teachers‘ Union.  In particular, I looked 
for specific individual roles and the chronology of events that led to the New York 
State Charter Schools Act.  The data collected from this set of interviews allowed me 
to analyze the degree to which Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) multiple streams of policy 
making applied to this particular case. 
With each interview, I attempted to discover specific factors and events that 
might have constituted the three streams of Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) multiple streams 
theory.  First, I looked for the features of the problem stream, the reason policy 
makers pay attention to one problem over another.  Kingdon (1995/2002) focused 
specifically on the way policy makers learn about conditions and the way conditions 
become thought of as problems as they let their values and beliefs guild their 
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decisions.  In this case, how did the issue of charter schools rise to the level of 
problem?  
Next, I looked for the second stream, policies.  Kingdon (1995/2002) 
described ideas being generated by a variety of specialists in policy networks that 
include legislative staffers, academics, and think tanks that all focus on a particular 
policy area.  They explore and test ideas via policy briefs, hearings, and 
conversations, with some ideas evolving and some surviving over others.  Via the 
data collection process of this study, I listened specifically for evidence of a charter 
school policy stream, where ideas for the best policy structure were explored.  In 
particular, what was the source or vetting of the multiple authorizer structure 
eventually featured in the Charter Schools Act?   
The third Kingdon stream is that of politics.  Kingdon (1995/2002) argued that 
key personnel in positions of high prominence have a significant impact on whether 
or not a policy gets critical attention.  Again through this study‘s data collection 
process, I looked for how the political roles of the governor, Assembly leadership, 
and others allowed the Charter Schools Act to receive the attention and priority it did.   
With Research Question 2, I aimed to determine how the perspectives of the 
different actors influence the multiple authorizing structures.  This question was again 
best answered by those who were directly involved in the process of bringing about 
the Charter Schools Act.  Interviews likely to yield data on this question again 
included Bellafiore and Murphy, but also included Carroll and Hayden, then 
chancellor of the New York State Board of Regents.  An analysis of these data via 
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Kingdon‘s policy stream as described above was particularly useful in answering this 
question. 
Kingdon‘s theory, as described briefly above, hinges on the convergence of 
the three streams at critical moments in time called policy windows.  When these 
windows open, it is the policy entrepreneur who seizes the opportunity to initiate 
action.  With this in mind, I analyzed interview data for evidence of the emergence of 
the policy window and whether specific policy entrepreneurs advanced the agenda.  
With Research Question 3, I attempted to ascertain how the multiple 
authorizing structures created in New York in 1998 have affected the current work of 
charter school authorization in the state since the law‘s inception.  Each interview 
subject was asked his perspective on the ultimate impact of the law.   
In addition to interviews, a thorough examination and analysis of the New 
York State Charter Schools Act and accompanying briefs and advocate opinions was 
made and coded for themes.  Such artifacts included initial bills set forth by various 
legislators leading up to the eventual Charter Schools Act.  In addition, I obtained bill 
jackets, policy briefs, and speeches put forth by key players.  Each document offered 
perspective on the intent and of the various actors on the bill.  Each was coded for 
citations of the justification for establishing multiple charter-school authorizing 
entities.  
Data Collection 
In this section, I describe the methods of data collection, the means through 
which the primary research question were answered (Maxwell, 2005).  Specifically, I 
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discuss data collection including documents and eight in-depth interviews (Seidman, 
2006).  Triangulation of methods occurred as a result of implementing multiple 
modes of data collection, which ultimately would provide a more comprehensive and 
accurate study (Maxwell, 2005).  
 I begin this section with a discussion of document data, because I collected 
particular documents up front to inform my interviews with all four primary 
participants.  By obtaining various data sources (triangulation), I sought to build my 
understanding of context and also to reduce possible misinterpretation of my 
participants‘ statements and strengthen the internal validity of my study (Maxwell, 
2005; Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003).  For example, by reviewing the bill 
jacket that accompanied the Charter Schools Act, I was better able to understand 
some of the technical policy language being described and interpreted by all the 
interview participants.  Before I conducted the interviews, I collected documents like 
the Charter Schools Act itself, its accompanying bill jacket, articles written on the 
development of the Charter Schools Act, other studies of the development of the 
Charter Schools Act, and issue briefs published by a variety of sources on the Charter 
Schools Act. 
According to Merriam (1998), unlike interview protocols, documents are not 
produced for directed research purposes.  Thus, compared with the interview material, 
the data that I gleaned from the documents were not particularly compelling in their 
own right.  The document data and key informant interviews helped me acquire a 
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greater context for my interviews with the interview participants and the analysis of 
these interviews. 
Data Analysis 
In this section, I lay out my methods of data analysis, which were ongoing and 
occurred simultaneously with data collection (Merriam, 1998; Rubin & Rubin, 1995).  
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), data analysis is ―the interplay between 
researchers and data‖ (p. 13).  The research questions and the data that I collected 
framed the methods I chose for data analysis (Maxwell, 2005).  The primary goal of 
my analysis was to determine how multiple authorizing structures came about in the 
New York State Charter Schools Act.  I relied upon categorization and 
contextualization methods to make sense of the data (Maxwell, 2005).  
Step 1: Analytic notes—Writing reflectively after the interviews. The first 
step of data analysis included writing preliminary notes (or reflective memos) after 
the interview as a way of preserving my initial impressions of those interviews.  Next, 
I listened to the recorded interviews and wrote reflectively about ideas that emerged 
after hearing the participants‘ words again.  I reviewed these reflective memos 
continuously as each reading allowed for deeper understanding and the development 
of more ideas (Maxwell, 2005).  The memos were a powerful means of recording my 
views and impressions of the information I gleaned from the interviews, such as 
notable quotes or personal biases (Rubin & Rubin, 1995).  As such, these memos 
served as the foundation for the analysis of my study. 
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Step 2: Transcribing participant interviews and reviewing transcriptions.  
The second step of analysis included verbatim transcription of the interviews with 
each participant.  I hired Sylvia Mallonee of the Transcription Place to perform the 
transcription, and I followed up by reviewing the transcripts against the digital 
recordings to ensure accuracy.  
First, I digitally recorded the interviews using in some circumstances an 
Olympus WS-500M Digital Voice Recorder and in others an iPhone with an external 
microphone as my recording devices (Maxwell, 2005; Seidman, 2006).  This method 
of recording was effective for two reasons.  First, the unimposing size of these 
minirecorders was less likely than a computer or other large recording device to feel 
threatening to participants.  Second, I had the flexibility of transferring the files to any 
other technological medium (e.g., MP3).  I hired a reputable transcription company 
for the digital transcription of the interviews.  Transcription immediately followed 
each interview, with analysis beginning as soon as transcripts were available 
(Maxwell, 2005).  Each participant was offered the opportunity to decline having his 
response recorded; none chose this option. 
Next, to check for accuracy, I examined and compared the digital recording to 
the written transcription (Rubin & Rubin, 1995).  The intention behind this step was 
to maintain descriptive validity (described in a section below).  I found that this step 
was extremely important because the professional transcriber, for example, was not 
familiar with specific terms and at times misunderstood what the participants said.  
Without going back and checking for descriptive validity, I easily could have 
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misinterpreted my participants‘ words due to the transcriber‘s mistakes.  Also, as I 
listened to the recordings, I paid attention to tone of voice, which often demonstrated 
nuances, such as sarcasm, that otherwise would not have been detected through a 
mere reading of the transcripts. 
This step of analysis also included reading the transcripts for the four 
components of my research questions.  It was important to approach the task of 
reviewing transcripts inductively.  For example, I read the transcripts with an open 
mind, allowing the data to illuminate ideas that I did not anticipate previously 
(Seidman, 2006).  Thus, the review of transcripts facilitated the creation of a 
preliminary code list outlined in the next step of data analysis. 
Step 3: Developing preliminary codes. I began this step of analysis by 
circling and underlining what stood out most to me in the transcripts.  I used a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to develop my code list (Frechtling & Sharp, 1997; Yin, 
2003). 
Whereas the interviews were at the heart of this analysis, documents were 
analyzed primarily for contextual purposes.  This step also included analyzing 
document data (e.g., bill jackets, newspaper articles, draft legislation, and actual 
legislation).  Both my memos and the document data provided a context for my 
interviews with the participants.  
Step 4: Categorizing by coding.  In this fourth step of analysis, I looked for 
more robust codes and created categories.  I developed preliminary substantive codes 
or descriptive subcategories of the organizational categories guided by a theoretical 
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approach, such as codes derived from my analysis of the literature (Maxwell, 2005; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  I framed theoretical codes in terms of each guiding research 
question and interview guide (Maxwell, 2005).  
In this fourth step of analysis, I coded the interview transcripts and documents 
that I collected during the interviews in order to group concepts and themes by 
similarities.  In this step, I ―fractured‖ the data according to particular categories 
(Maxwell, 2005, p. 96). This step of data analysis took place for each interview.  I 
analyzed data from one participant first—for example, the interview transcript of my 
interview of Tom Carroll.  Next, I placed interview data into matrices, visual 
displays, headed by the previous codes.  Then, I moved on to the next interview in 
order to make within-case comparisons first, followed by cross-case comparisons 
later. 
The aim of this step was to look for emerging themes and relationships in the 
transcripts and documents by conceptualizing and grouping the data into 
organizational categories for further analysis (Maxwell, 2005; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).  According to Maxwell (2005), organizational categories are broad topics 
established before data collection that function as ―bins‖ (p. 97) for sorting the data 
during analysis.  However, as I delved more deeply into analysis, I also reviewed 
robust codes as a way of developing substantive categories, which are 
characteristically inductive and descriptive (Frechtling & Sharp, 1997; Maxwell, 




Given my relationship to this research topic and to the participants, I attended 
to validity threats throughout the study (Maxwell, 2005).  The two types of validity 
threats with respect to study design were researcher bias and reactivity (Maxwell, 
2005).  In terms of interpreting data, I attended to the following validity threats: 
descriptive validity, interpretive validity, and theoretical validity (Maxwell, 2005).  
Researcher bias. Researcher bias is ―the selection of data that fit the 
researcher‘s existing theory or preconceptions and the selection of data that ‗stand 
out‘ to the researcher‖ (Maxwell, 2005, p. 108).  I recognize that as executive director 
of the SUNY Charter Schools Institute, I came to this research with a set of 
assumptions and biases about New York‘s multiple authorizing structures.  I 
addressed researcher bias by writing and revisiting analytic memos as a means of 
reflection in order to understand clearly what my assumptions looked like (Wolcott, 
1995).  I also shared my analyses with a treatise writing partner and my treatise 
committee chairman, both trained in qualitative data analysis.  In this way, I 
determined whether my biases might influence how I analyzed the data.  
In addition, I personally coded all of the interviews and did not create a 
separate peer review step to the coding process.  While I made every attempt to code 
without bias, it is important to acknowledge there were no structures to ensure 
interrater reliability.   
Reactivity.  According to Maxwell (2005), reactivity is ―the influence of the 
researcher on the setting or individuals studied‖ (p. 108).  For example, my role as 
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researcher and as executive director of the SUNY Charter Schools Institute might 
have influenced how my participants viewed me.  I might have been perceived as 
knowing more about the content because I had been implementing the Charter 
Schools Act for over 2 years when the interviews took place.  My knowledge of the 
Charter Schools Act due to my research in this area might have intimidated others; 
therefore, this might have influenced how participants responded to my interview 
questions.  
I attended to these potential validity threats in two ways.  First, I articulated to 
the participants that they were the experts and that I was in a position to learn from 
them.  Second, I tried to avoid asking leading questions by designing and sticking to 
the interview protocol shown above.  I solicited and received feedback on the 
interview protocol from my treatise committee chair. 
Descriptive validity.  Strategies that attend to descriptive validity threats 
must ensure that data are accurate and factual.  It was important that I implemented 
strategies, like verbatim transcription of recorded interviews as opposed to selective 
transcription, in order to avoid misinterpretation (Maxwell, 2005).  I also shared my 
interpretation of the interviews with the participants, a method that is known as 
respondent validation (or member checking), to ensure that their words were 
accurately recorded and not taken out of context (Merriam, 1998).  
Interpretive validity.  To avoid pigeonholing the data in a way that satisfied 
my assumptions, I implemented strategies such as respondent validation, as described 
in the previous section (Merriam, 1998; Seidman, 2006).  Another strategy for 
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attending to interpretive validity threats was sharing my data with my treatise writing 
partner to cross-check codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Theoretical validity.  My position at the time of data collection and analysis 
was executive director of the SUNY Charter Schools Institute.  This allowed me 
access to these interviews with participants and observations that could ―help rule out 
spurious associations and premature theories‖ (Maxwell, 2005, p. 110).  I searched 
for discrepant data by rigorously reexamining and sharing the data with colleagues to 
ensure the accuracy of my conclusions (Maxwell, 2005).  
Chapter Summary 
 In this case study, I sought to examine the interview participants‘ perceptions 
of the charter policy-making process.  Through the qualitative methodological plan 
laid out in this chapter, I explored the participants‘ perspectives as to the process of 
charter-authorizing policy making.  In this chapter, I discussed the rationale for my 
study site and participant selection.  I also explained my data collection methods and 
iterative process of data analysis.  Finally, I described how I attended to validity 
threats.  In Chapter 4, I present the results of this process and follow it with my 
discussion and recommendations in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
In the previous chapter I explained the methodology used to collect and 
analyze the data regarding the three research questions examined in this study.  The 
following chapter presents the findings of this research, namely the processes that led 
to multiple authorizers being a feature of the Charter Schools Act, how the 
perspectives of the different actors involved influenced the multiple authorizing 
structures, and the how the multiple authorizing structures created in New York State 
in 1998 ultimately affected the current work of charter school authorization in the 
state.  Features of the process that to the New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 
were discovered via the coding of interviews described in Chapter 3.  The data 
presented here are themes that emerged from a review of the interview transcripts 
collected for this study.  
Research Question 1: What Were the Processes That Led to Current Multiple 
Authorizing Structures? 
To answer Research Question 1, I examined the processes that led to multiple 
authorizers being a feature of the Charter Schools Act of 1998.  The data showed that 
the multiple authorizers provision was essentially a by-product of the processes that 
led to the bill itself, as there was little evidence of specific processes that led to the 
emergence of the multiple authorizers provision in particular.  
Findings from an examination of the processes that led to the passage of the 
Charter Schools Act generally support the tenets of Kingdon‘s multiple streams 
framework.  In this section, I describe this process in terms of Kingdon‘s framework, 
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discussing these results in terms of the policy stream, the political stream, and the 
problem stream. 
Policy stream. The processes that led to the passage of the Charter Schools 
Act fit neatly into Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) assertion that policies result from rare 
opportunity where problem, politics, and policy collide.  With the will of Governor 
Pataki in place, the problem having been kept alive by policy entrepreneurs, and the 
policy of the pay raise for legislators opening a policy window, a policy collision did 
indeed take place.  Three central themes arose in examining the passage of the 
Charter Schools Act in relation to Kingdon‘s policy stream: (a) diverse specialists, (b) 
technical feasibility, and (c) the opening of a policy window.  Below, I present a 
subsection on each. 
Diverse specialists with common concern.  Kingdon‘s theory holds that in 
order to pass legislation, diverse specialists with common concern for one area of 
policy problems are needed.  Internal specialists and external specialists who led to 
the bill itself were present in this processes leading up to the passage of the Charter 
Schools Act.   
There was a real mix of advocates and experts regarding this particular issue. 
Tom Carroll described the coalition working toward the bill as including appointed 
experts on the Republican governor‘s team, but also Democratic New York City 
clergymen.  Carroll described this as a ―kind of strange bedfellow coalition that 
developed around the issue.‖  Carroll went on to describe Governor Pataki‘s 
transition from being a ―conservative Republican‖ and not having much to talk to 
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people in inner-city neighborhoods about as a key part of his interest in pursuing this 
agenda item. 
Bellafiore noted the coalition of specialists:  
Here you had a conservative, White Republican standing up with Black 
ministers calling for something that where 100% of the beneficiaries of the 
policies are going to be in areas not normally associated with conservative 
Republican ideology. 
Peter Murphy added that most people saw the charter issue as a White, Republican, 
conservative think-tank issue, but added, ―What that overlooks is that you had… 
prominent members of the African American community and Latino community that 
did favor this.‖ 
Value acceptability and technical feasibility.  Kingdon (1995/2002) also 
argued that any successful policy issue must have technical feasibility and value 
acceptability.  Technical feasibility refers to the prospect of the provisions of the 
policy being procedurally possible, whereas value acceptability refers to the 
palatability of the approach to the key decision makers.  A process was taken by the 
policy entrepreneurs to ensure throughout the process that the eventual charter 
schools bill would be both technically feasible and have broad enough value 
acceptability—it was this work that ultimately kept the charter issue alive. 
In terms of promoting value acceptability, the policy entrepreneurs felt like 
they needed to keep the charter bill alive because very few initiatives are successful 
on their first try.  Bellafiore noted, ―Very few complicated issues are passed on their 
initial go around, especially when there opposed by one of the two or three groups 
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that take turns running Albany.‖  Policy entrepreneurs kept the push for a charter bill 
alive by appealing to interests of politicians throughout the process. According to 
Carroll, 
The first challenge is actually to keep your advocate for the issue or the 
governor interested in the issue and for him to become more and more 
passionate about your interest over time rather than have it flame out and it 
goes on to the next new thing.  And I think he became convinced what made it 
work for us is Pataki got—the more and more he knew about charters and the 
more and more he went to events in which all these unlikely people were 
standing next to him, the more and more jazzed he got about the issue.  And as 
it played out, he also thought that he had, I think he increasingly thought he 
had the high moral ground on the issue.  That he was for getting quality 
options to needy kids and the other guys, you know you basically had a bunch 
of special interests trying to kill it off.  It had no reason other than it broke up 
their monopoly.  
Carroll went on to say that, for the bill to be successful, it was imperative that 
the Governor not just introduce it but also fully back it in order to get the attention of 
the Legislature.  The policy entrepreneurs worked hard to achieve this, according to 
Bellafiore: 
And we continued to work the issue throughout the summer and the fall so 
that—well, for two reasons.  One, to make sure that everybody stayed active 
so that the issue stayed alive, and two, importantly, so that the governor knew 
that this was something he needs to put on his wish list. 
Once the governor was convinced that this was a winning policy, Governor 
Pataki started to own and value the issue even more.  According to Faso, ―I think 
from a political perspective they pushed on this to Pataki‘s agenda, and I think Pataki 
soon became sold on the idea, on the notion, and that‘s really how it all evolved.‖ 
Carroll also offered, 
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So I think in his sense, in terms of positioning, that was a pretty good place to 
be, so he got more and more attached to the idea, and in an executive 
dominated state it was all about, you know, there was a grass roots aspect to it, 
but it ultimately came down to a trade between legislative leaders and the 
governor.  So his motivation became more important than anything else.  So 
his evolution of being passively interested in it and then becoming really, 
really interested in it.  
Not only did policy entrepreneurs spend their time building the investment of 
the governor to keep the issue alive, but they also did so by making it more 
acceptable to outside forces.  Backstrom and Bellafiore described creating the Charter 
School Resource Center at the Empire Foundation in order to drum up public support.  
Bellafiore said, ―For a year and a half we did the hard work of organizing, talking to 
people, and elevating the issue in a public and political consciousness.‖ Backstrom 
added,  
We thought one of the best way to grow the movement and the public pressure 
was to actually get people seriously thinking about it in such a way that they 
would actually pen the papers saying, ―Here is the type of school I envision.‖  
I think that was significant not so much for the politicians as it was for the 
public, and we sort of were able to create a buzz that there is an alternative out 
here, obviously with 30 or 35 other states already doing it, the ability to point 
at something that had happened was there, but it wasn‘t home grown.   
Consistent with Kingdon‘s multiple streams framework and the concept of 
policy stream, policy entrepreneurs needed to sift through the specific proposed 
measures to determine their assessment of technical feasibility of each in addition to 
making sure of its value acceptability.  To that end, particular items were kept in and 
taken out of the bill to ensure the votes would be there to ultimately pass the bill.  
Carroll noted the omission of a clause that would have provided charters funding for 
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facilities.  It was left out due to the perception that it might cost too much, particularly 
in New York City: 
We attempted to get in the Assembly but they wouldn‘t agree to just literally 
just add on an extra $1,000, $1,500 per pupil to every kid in New York City, 
just because the expense structure there is different than anywhere on the 
planet, then ultimately were not able to get that in.   
Other examples of improving technical feasibility were offered by Murphy, 
who noted that the group lowered the number of charters proposed, created a trigger 
for automatic unionization of charter school teachers if a threshold of 250 students 
was exceeded in first 2 years of charter operation, and requirements around the 
certification of charter teachers all in the name of making the bill more feasible to 
opponents.  In particular, policy entrepreneurs considered the feasibility and 
acceptability of the bill relative to the views of the state teacher unions.  Either unions 
had to be on board enough or legislators needed to be persuaded to ignore the wishes 
of the unions to make bill passage possible.  Backstrom said, 
I think another critical point clearly was Pataki‘s veto of the additional 
education spending. The other one was to give UFT [United Federation of 
Teachers] what they wanted, which had the unique kickback effect of 
allowing Pataki to be able to sever them completely, because it never would 
have happened in others, you know, the obvious pairing with the legislature 
pay hike. 
A last example of technical feasibility was the proposal of the existence of 
charter schools versus that of private school vouchers.  As a contrast to a charter bill 
that could be tweaked into tolerability, it was a far more acceptable outcome to 
opponents than another education reform effort, that of private school vouchers.  
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Bellafiore offered, ―Vouchers would never happen, so [charters] was the next best 
thing to do.‖ 
A policy window opened.  Kingdon‘s multiple streams framework describes 
successful policy creation as a result of a policy window opening, allowing for the 
streams to converge.  Such was the case with the rise of the Charter Schools Act.  
Below I describe how policy entrepreneurs first kept the issue alive long enough for 
the problem that needed to be solved to ―float by,‖ thereby being in position to take 
advantage of the open policy window.  Policy entrepreneurs then faced choices about 
which issues to push and how to do so within the limited policy window.  
Policy entrepreneurs kept the issue alive.  With hopes that a policy window 
would open, the policy entrepreneurs kept the issue of charter schools in play.  
Bellafiore added, ―We did a lot of hard work of reaching out and making sure that 
people were aware that the governor wanted to do this thing and then bringing them 
in.‖   
In addition to gaining public support over time, policy entrepreneurs used 
politics and persuasion to keep the bill alive.  According to Faso,  
It was just the means of persuasion you always use. You hold out—you try to 
make good arguments as to why this is good from a philosophy—and then 
with people who philosophy doesn‘t work with, you use the favors, and with 
people who the favors don‘t work, you use threats.  I mean it‘s democracy.  
With all the work the policy entrepreneurs did to keep the charter school issue 
alive until a policy window opened, they believed all along that the bill would finally 
 
85 
get its chance.  Bellafiore said, ―We kept the ball on the table.  Eventually somebody 
is going to put his head down and swing.‖ He went on to say, 
And that was the same model up with charter schools, the same thing that we 
ran just 2 years later, which was keep the thing alive, work the thing when 
nobody is paying attention.  Let the public spotlight be shining over there; 
we‘re going to do go do our thing over here, because at some point the 
governor is going to want to pull it off the shelf and come in at the end.  Sort 
of come in for bell—and he was active, he had to meet with people that we 
wanted him to meet with all through the process, but it was never a high 
priority because nobody thought they could win it.  So the policy 
entrepreneurships agreed term for it, but it‘s something that people who are in 
public strategy live with all the time. 
According to Faso, Carroll, Backstrom, and Bellafiore, it was their set of key 
specialists that kept the issue alive—namely staffers for the governor and the external 
think tanks of Education Reform and Change New York.  Carl Hayden noted the 
conservative think tank Manhattan Institute along with Tom Carroll as particularly 
important players in the process in ―providing the intellectual grist for what was a 
distinctly political act.‖  Backstrom stated a slightly different explanation in saying 
that there would not have been any clamor for this issue if local policy entrepreneurs 
were not pitching it as if, despite interest from more established groups like the 
Manhattan Institute and some of the national groups, ―there wasn‘t really a home 
grown effort other than the ones that we instigated.‖   
In describing the work of the think tanks and advocates like Carroll, Faso 
noted, ―Those folks were really quite dedicated to getting something done.‖  Carroll 
agreed, saying, ―Our assignment was to make it part of the agenda.‖  He went on to 
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say, ―Yeah, our role was we were the principle group agitating for the bill to be 
advocating for the bill to be adopted in the first place.‖ 
Carroll saw himself and his colleagues as the specialists responsible for 
keeping the process alive, particularly given the strength of what he saw as the policy 
opposition.  He said, 
It‘s one thing having another idea; it‘s another thing to be able to get it in.  
And then the third thing is another thing to actually be able to have it 
executed.  And there‘s a lot of examples where all three haven‘t happened 
simultaneously.  So, for example, the Manhattan Institute spent a lot of time 
kind of working on the idea, side of charter schools, but they had no capacity 
to get anybody to do anything with the kind of the broad theory of charter 
schools.  A bunch of great papers, great conferences, but it didn‘t translate 
into politics.  And then you could translate some of the politics, but there still 
has to be an implementation and continuous improvement that follows after 
that.  And then, because the charter schools, there is a whole political aspect to 
this in terms of—because the teachers unions are on the other side.  There had 
to be—in some states there has not been a counterweight to the power of 
teachers unions on charters. 
Policy entrepreneurs pushed the issue through the window.  With the policy 
entrepreneurs deciding to keep the bill alive, they waited for a problem to ―float by.‖  
Carroll actually described the convergence of the two issues of the legislative pay 
hike and the charter schools bill as a ―locomotive that couldn‘t be stopped.‖  
The timing of this process was critical, according to Bellafiore: 
Good timing—the law would never have been passed if the legislature didn‘t 
want its first pay raise in 10 years.  Which is how it eventually got passed in 
1998, in fact on the last day of session in 1998 I was talking to one of the 
guys, one of the community organizers we had been working with, and he 
said, ―Well, what are we going to do now?‖ I said, ―We‘re going to wait for 
the pay raise bill,‖ and Governor Pataki, to his great credit of all the things he 
could have asked for in exchange for something that the legislature would 
have sold its mother for, he said charter schools. 
 
87 
Policy entrepreneurs believed that they needed to work quickly given their sense that 
the window would only be open a short while.  According to Carroll, they therefore 
took action quickly: 
At the time people had argued with us that, you know, we‘ll never be able to 
do another deal.  This is the best offer, which how negotiations go and it‘s just 
like.  I didn‘t believe it then, and we were vindicated at the end of the year.  
So then after you know we figured holding up the money clearly didn‘t work, 
we went through the summer.  It included under Mario Cuomo, they had a 
provision the state aid that was equivalent to, they were subsidizing a $1,000 
incentive for every single teacher in New York City, which was a gift in a 
sense with tax money, which he adopted before one of the times he was 
running for reelection.  So the thought was the union leaders were opposing it, 
by digging their hills were costing each member $1,000, so we thought that 
that would play on them, and they did not bat an eye.  So there was no 
indication of any weakness or hesitation or anything whatsoever. 
Moving quickly given the limited window of time, the policy entrepreneurs 
faced choices of which issues to push and how.  As an example, they decided that it 
made more sense to prioritize charters and abandon the more politically risky issue of 
private school vouchers.  Backstrom said, 
There were people even within our sphere that didn‘t like the notion of charter 
schools, because it thought it bartered down the attempt to get vouchers and 
public stayed as bad as it was longer.  That people might be more readily able 
to swallow something as dramatic as school choice vouchers.  
As choices were made, policy entrepreneurs developed detailed proposals so 
as to take advantage of the policy window.  Murphy described the process as follows:  
We designed what the charter law would look like.  Like this is what it will 
do.  It will allow a lot of unlimited charters, it will allow multiple authorizers, 
you know all the things that make for a good charter law, to be kind of 
gobbled up from other states.  …So we knew what made for a strong charter 
school law, so that was how we designed ours…primarily with the research 
that had been done during the year dealing with I guess it was the Empire 
Foundation of Policy Research, which was Tom Carroll and Brian Backstrom, 
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and Center for Education Reform, which had done a lot of the state-by-state 
rating system and all of that.  So we knew what made for a strong charter 
school law, so that was how we designed ours. 
Carroll offered up a few of the other detailed considerations made by the 
policy entrepreneurs, including an approach to appease the teacher unions by limited 
the size of an opening school by making it mandatory that the school unionize if it 
started with over 250 students.   
Our view was it‘s a good idea for the schools to start small anyway, so as a 
practical matter the [automatic unionization] provision would never get 
triggered, with the exception of, the only schools that would normally go 
higher than that would be the for profits.  So then another provision was put in 
that some of the for profits for financial reasons would have to start higher 
than that [number of charters], so there had to be the ability of making a 
separate category, if you will.  So then what Bob and other people called the 
Super Waiver provision got put in, in which Pataki said, ―Okay, I‘ll accept 
250 but only in Year 1, but in Year 1 I want the ability to issue these Super 
Waivers.‖  
According to Lubin,  
For [the teacher unions] it was the issue of maintaining the rights to be 
unionized.  The key issue for us was the 250 threshold. Many of the for-profits 
got around that by starting the first 249 students, and it was really a clear 
message to us that they were coming and—but that was the threshold. 
Backstrom added that the policy entrepreneurs had to settle for what they felt 
were less than ideal funding provisions in order to see the bill pass: 
You know we got no capital money at all.  We were like, so what if facilities 
are the hardest issue?  We still want the policy; we want the door open.  And 
so it was more of a practical approach, but we surely didn‘t want to start from 
the weakest law or the 25th weakest law in the nation.  We needed a strong 
base on which to build.  
Detailed proposals were offered by actors on both sides of the charter issue, 
but it was clear that policy entrepreneurs in favor of charters could not get everything 
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they wanted.  According to Bellafiore, there were other non-charter-related issues that 
needed to be considered along with the charter bill: 
He had two other issues, and both were related to budget reform.  One was 
stipulating that the legislature would not be paid while the budget was late.  
They get all their money, but you can‘t reduce their pay because it‘s set in 
statute so they get, so it‘s withheld until the budget is done.  And the third one 
was some other sort of technical budget reform that had to do with the 
language of the way the budget—so it was three things that the governor 
asked for, and there might have been a fourth, but charter schools was the big 
one, and everyone always says, ―Well, you know the only reason Charter 
Schools got passed was because the legislators wanted a pay raise.‖  
Political stream.  Tenets of Kingdon‘s political stream were also consistent 
with the process that led to the passage of the Charter Schools Act.  The following 
section describes the role Governor Pataki played in driving the bill forward, the 
minor role of political party influence, the consideration paid to key interest groups, 
the influence of the national mood on the issue, and the lack of pressure from 
upcoming elections. 
Politicians set the agenda—Governor Pataki led the way.  The key politician 
in the rise of the Charter Schools Act was clearly Governor George Pataki.  Hayden 
stated, ―It certainly appeared that Governor Pataki was the primary sponsor.‖  All of 
the interviews supported the notion that without Governor Pataki‘s public and 
backroom support, the Charter Schools Act would not have gained any traction.  The 
following sections describe how Governor Pataki‘s interest in the area grew, why he 
was compelled to drive the effort, and why ultimately it was his leadership that made 
the difference.  
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Although Governor Pataki ultimately made charters a priority, it took some 
time for him to decide to do so.  When the issue was raised in earlier session via early 
bills, Governor Pataki showed little interest. According to Murphy, 
Governor Pataki, looking for a new area in which to make his mark, willingly 
introduced a—what we would call a pure Charter School Bill in 1997.  He 
introduced it as part of his package of gubernatorial legislation, and we were 
pretty happy about it, but I think there was no push at all from the Executive, 
and it died sort of an easy death. …I never got the impression the governor 
was that interested yet.  He put it out there, but this was not a priority in his 
mind, that‘s my understanding.  And it‘s not a knock on him, it just, again, 
there were still a lot of other issues into play. 
As described in previous sections, the policy entrepreneurs helped convince 
Governor Pataki of both the issue‘s importance and feasibility.  Carroll described that 
it was Governor Pataki‘s motivation that solidified the deal that led to the legislation: 
So I think in his sense, in terms of positioning, that was a pretty good place to 
be, so he got more and more attached to the idea, and in an executive 
dominated state it was all about—you know, there was a grass roots aspect to 
it, but it ultimately came down to a trade between legislative leaders and the 
governor.  So his motivation became more important than anything else.  So 
his evolution of being passively interested in it and then becoming really, 
really interested in it.  
Once Governor Pataki did prioritize it, the issue of charter schools moved 
forward.  Faso indicated that Governor Pataki‘s support made all the difference 
relative to earlier attempts to move charter schools onto the agenda: ―Once the 
governor‘s office decided this was something they wanted to do, they really worked 
hard at putting together a strong bill.‖  
Faso concurred with Hayden‘s statement above, noting that it was the 
governor‘s office that ultimately moved the bill forward.  
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Because it was so much driven on an inside basis, the governor and his staff 
with the Charter School Advocates drove the legislation, they drove the 
drafting and everything like that.  And when push came to shove they forced 
the legislature—both houses, the Republicans and the Democrats, and this is 
Republican and Democrats in the assembly—they forced them to do it and 
only by holding—whoever came up with that device, whoever made that 
decision and the governor, either it was the governor or the governor‘s staff, 
whoever made that decision that this was the fruit that they should offer them 
in order to take the poison.  They really deserve a tremendous amount of 
credit. 
Murphy also offered the analysis that the bill came down to the Chief 
Executive being willing to push the bill over the top.  He went on to say, 
Ultimately it came down to a willing governor and supportive governor, you 
know with enough kind of pressure momentum that was built up.  …So you 
had a 2-year vetting of this legislation and so why ultimately—it was a willing 
governor and you had some key allies and we were the 34
th
 state, so I think it 
was just a desire to try something and a willingness of enough key people to 
make it happen. 
Whereas getting the bill done at all came down to the governor, so did the 
inclusion of particular provisions of the bill.  One key provision the governor wanted 
included dealt with the issue of charter school authorization power.  Interview 
participants overwhelmingly agreed that the reason the bill ultimately split 
authorization powers was because the governor wanted it happen, or to at least 
weaken the power of the New York State Board of Regents.  Carroll described 
Governor Pataki‘s push for this specific measure that would allow for the executive-
controlled SUNY Board of Trustees to essentially have autonomy over the schools 
they authorized: 
So the other quickie provision is what I call the ping-pong provision of the 
law in which the governor said it‘s got to be an entity I control: SUNY.  The 
Speaker is saying, no, it‘s got to be the Board of Regents, which I control.  
 
92 
And then they say, okay, well, it will be half and half then.  And then the 
Speaker said, well, I still don‘t want—you know the regents is supposed to be 
control of everything in the state, and so the regents have to have the final say.   
As Carroll‘s quote indicates, while the Governor was clearly driving the 
agenda, the Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver was another politician impacting the 
agenda.  Hayden described the ultimate deal as having come from ―a private 
conversation‖ between the two.  Bellafiore and Lubin made specific note of the same.  
Hayden explained that Silver‘s Assembly colleagues had a pay raise to gain from 
these negotiations, and Silver was their leader. 
Fundamentally a conversation between George Pataki and Shelley Silver—
and remember that it‘s Shelley‘s members who live in the city where 
everything costs more.  Usually the ones who are most aggressive on the 
subject of seeking pay increases.  You‘re seeing that played out again this 
week.  They‘ve unhooked the judges‘ salaries and now there is, you know, a 
lot of agitation about a pay increase because there hasn‘t been one in I think 
10 years or something.  And it‘s because this is, for many of them the only job 
they have, and they have trouble getting by on their legislative income.  So the 
pressure in the Assembly on the Speaker is much greater than the pressure in 
the Senate on the majority vote. 
Political party affiliation.  The role of political parties is not prominent in 
Kingdon‘s multiple streams framework.  However, political party affiliation was 
mentioned frequently in the data, so a code was created for it.  Results showed that, 
although it came up frequently, political party affiliation had little to nothing to do 
with the process or outcome.  Rather, it was an ideology regarding school choice that 
seemed to play a bigger role.  Murphy said, 
I don‘t see [party mattering].  I just don‘t think that entered in, I mean it may 
have comported with people‘s political philosophy but ultimately that 
doesn‘t—I don‘t see it playing a big role, there are other factors.  There has to 
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be supporters behind it, there has to be some momentum, I don‘t think—I 
mean very little is done for political philosophical reasons that I can detect. 
Carroll agreed that political ideology had little to do with the outcome: 
And then a lot of what went into it is just brass knuckles politics, it had 
nothing to do with philosophy.  It was just there are facts on the ground in 
New York politically, were barriers that had to be addressed in order to take 
an idea that a lot of people agreed with but to practically get it adopted in 
functional way in New York, there were just practical, on-the-ground 
obstacles that had to be worked through. 
 Backstrom said Governor Pataki was more driven by the traditionally 
conservative political philosophy of school choice rather than general conservative 
political party or even ideology as a whole.  Not all interview participants agreed on 
this issue.  Carl Hayden believed the move was very much driven by political 
ideology, saying that Governor Pataki was acting upon an ―impulse abroad in the 
Republican Party, which was an ideological commitment to the power of the market 
to affect better results in every realm.‖  He went on to say, 
The theory is that charter schools would create a competitive dynamic in 
public education that would have the result of strengthening the entire 
enterprise.  That was certainly the way in which the philosophical 
underpinnings of the proposed Charter Schools Act were portrayed to the 
public. 
While there was some disagreement as to the role of political ideology and 
party on the part of the proponents of the bill, interview participants indicated that 
opponents of the bill were driven by political ideology.  Backstrom mentioned the 
Democrats in the legislature positioned themselves with the interests of teacher 
unions and their views on school choice rather than the liberal political ideology as a 
whole.  Bellafiore said this of the Democratic controlled Assembly: 
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I think in the State Assembly they believed very, very strongly in the existing 
public educational system.  And they believed that schools that have, they 
believe the rules are in place for a reason.  The regulations are in place for a 
reason and that the structures that currently exist in the district K-12 system 
won‘t matter and that the only thing that they really need is more money.  I 
think that is a deeply held personal philosophy, and to their dying day they 
will all say that that is the right way to do it.  
Bellafiore believed that Governor Pataki‘s desire to be a centrist led him to 
keep his party affiliation in check. He explained that in New York, a predominantly 
Democratic state, Republicans running for state-wide office need to appeal to some 
Democrats.  Bellafiore also pointed that national Republican attention to school 
choice likely influenced the process.  
The same sort of way you look at your neighbor‘s lawn and say, ―Well, I 
wonder how they get their lawn so nice, what could I do to do that?‖  So that 
was one.  Two, it was an initiative that was being pushed primarily by 
conservative Republican thinkers and funders because it was market driven 
and two it had a real market point of view about school reform, which is until 
you start to take away—until you affect people‘s cash flow, they won‘t pay 
attention.  So it was largely pushed by Republicans. 
While Republicans were the more likely party to be pushing charter schools 
nationally, this issue broke traditional political party lines.  Multiple interview 
participants discussed the coalition of conservative, White Republicans and 
Democratic inner-city Black ministers described above.  Bellafiore described this 
phenomenon as follows: 
One hundred percent of the beneficiaries of the policies are going to be in 
areas not normally associated with conservative Republican ideology.  So it 
finally broke through that barrier, that political barrier that Democrats had 
always used to talk to urban constituency groups about, ―They don‘t care 
about you.‖  Well, here was one they clearly cared about you.  Part of that was 
it was a major initiative of the Clinton Administration, so it sort of helped 
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build that thing that this is not a partisan issue.  So it had to the core elements 
of something that gets the political processes attention.  
Political party control also came into play when it came to who would 
authorize charters and essentially control them.  Backstrom described splitting powers 
between the Republican (Executive) controlled SUNY board and the Democratic 
(Assembly) controlled Board of Regents as ―an unequivocal decision to give control 
to Republicans and to Democrats.‖   
Politicians considered the views of interest groups.  While the politicians 
drove the agenda without a strong role played by political party affiliation, the special 
interest groups (New York State United Teachers, United Federation of Teachers, 
New York City Department of Education, New York State School Board Association, 
legislators themselves) were all considered during this process by Governor Pataki.  
Carroll noted this consideration as intentional, saying that after the idea was 
―popularized,‖ the policy entrepreneurs determined how best to manage the interest 
group politics.  He said, ―So the question was how Governor Pataki could leverage 
something else to get them to adopt it.‖  Lubin described the state teacher union‘s 
nonopposition of the Charter Schools Act despite their clear opposition to charter 
schools in general.  
There were tremendous political ramifications in the state at that time.  We 
were able to get some pieces [unintelligible on recording] some immunization 
and some basic rights of the people working in charter schools.  Not nearly 
what we thought was necessary, but to the point where we did not have to 
oppose the bill. 
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To prevent them from opposing the bill, the unions ultimately did get some 
concessions including the 250-student provision described earlier. 
The Pataki Administration considered not only the anticharter school lobbies 
but also, obviously, the procharter special interest groups.  Change New York and 
Education Reform New York, both described above, were key resources for the 
governor‘s office.  Education Reform New York‘s Backstrom described the nature of 
his group‘s role: 
So whether he was doing that because he thought we knew a lot about charters 
or whether he was doing it to make sure that political positioning was correct, 
you know only he would know the answer to that question.  But the upshot is 
we were called on these provisions and we were—sometimes the call was 
from Bob [Bellafiore], sometimes from his budget director, sometimes 
directly from the governor to check on different provisions.  And similarly as 
we heard things going what we thought were the wrong way, the calls were at 
times in the reverse. 
These conservative special interests were interested not just in advancing the 
creation of charter schools but also in limiting the role of teacher unions in New York 
State public education.  Carroll described his group‘s advocacy for a funding system 
for charters that might achieve both objectives, saying that the money to fund charters 
should come through districts and not be directly state appropriated, given what he 
saw as a potential annual state budget fight with the legislatively influential unions. 
When the bill was finally agreed upon, it was clear that the most important 
special interest involved was the Assembly itself, who opted to allow charters in 
return for a pay raise.  Bellafiore stated, 
Well, it was ultimately passed and signed because of the pay raise, but I would 
say that the pay raise provided cover for a lot of legislators to vote for this 
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thing, when they otherwise would not have been able to because of pressure 
from the unions. 
Tom Carroll described it as follows: 
Like what would get the legislature to do something contrary to the wishes of 
their one of their two most significant donors, the other being SEIU [Service 
Employees International Union]. And the conclusion was there was only one 
thing that would and that was, you know, a direct legislative pay hike.  In 
which the calculation was that their self-interest was then misaligned with 
their political interest and they would choose self-interest over political 
interest.  And Pataki for the rest of the year disclaimed any interest in doing a 
pay hike whatsoever.  And then after the election they kept—the background 
on a pay hike in New York, constitutionally you have to adopt it prior to the 
2-year session, which you want to get the pay hike.  So they knew that if they 
didn‘t agree with him on the pay hike, by December 31
st
 of that year, they 
wouldn‘t be able to get a pay hike for another 2 years.   
National mood impacted the rise of the agenda.  The politics around the issue 
of school choice were on the rise around the country, and that played a role in the 
issue having political acceptability.  Lubin described a ―national pressure‖ put on 
Governor Pataki and New York to do charter schools right.  Hayden offered the view 
that Governor Pataki wanted to ―make a splash nationally.‖  Bellafiore indicated that 
the issue of charter schools was particularly popular with conservatives around the 
country and in New York in that they would constitute a rare policy shift that would 
not come with additional fiscal impact.  Bellafiore also described the effect of charter 
school legislation developing around the country as noted above.  
 Carroll described the national work on charters as comforting to Governor 
Pataki: 
The fact that three dozen states had already done it, in his mind I suspect gave 
him a lot of political comfort and that there was on a national level it was 
viewed as a bipartisan issue.  It was not viewed as particularly in a lot of 
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states, and so he didn‘t think, whereas if it was like vouchers or something he 
would that was maybe a little too edgy for him.  I thought he was pushing 
something that wasn‘t too radical in his mind.  He was totally entranced with 
the kind of strange bedfellow coalition that developed around the issue. 
Pressure of elections and political turnover.  While many of the tenets of 
Kingdon‘s multiple streams framework, particularly the political stream, are 
consistent with the rise of the Charter Schools Act, there was relatively little threat of 
political turnover driving the agenda at all.  Rather, Governor Pataki was in a 
comfortable position relative to the election cycle.  The issue of charter schools was 
not something where political turnover was a threat and was therefore less of an issue 
than Kingdon seemed to argue. That said, people close to Governor Pataki believed 
he had national aspirations and wanted to expand his outreach to inner-city 
constituents, so the issue of elections was not completely absent from consideration 
during this process. 
Governor Pataki‘s support of the bill was to be seen as centrist, thereby 
making him more electable in a majority-Democratic state. Carroll posited, 
As a Republican, really started out as conservative Republican, he didn‘t 
frankly have a lot to talk to people in certain neighborhoods about, he didn‘t 
have a lot of things to talk people like Floyd Flake or Calvin Butts and these 
other people.  So, and there were a lot of community groups including at the 
time the Hispanic Federation that were very interested in the issue, and so I 
think for him—and he‘s always viewed himself as kind of the more moderate 
part of the Republican Party.  It would allow him to create a conversation with 
a bunch of people he really didn‘t have much to talk about with otherwise, and 
I think he was very attracted to that.  And in terms of do-ability, any issue 
where you can get strange alliances and you can cut into the other guys‘ base 
makes it more politically possible, because in a Democratic state as a 
Republican governor selling a purely Republican issue is not, you know, 
successful strategy.  So in this one case, since the beneficiaries were largely 
going to be low-income, minority children in Democratic households, he 
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ultimately thought that there would be no way for the Democrats to block it.  
That at some point they would have to do it.  Whereas if it was some other 
issue, you know, they might not have been as flexible. 
Problem stream. The tenets of Kingdon‘s problem stream were met, but not 
as clearly as the others.  Although it became clear that a significant problem needed to 
be solved and that the problem was brought to the attention of the policy makers by 
the policy entrepreneurs, it is not evident that a dramatic or focusing event seized the 
attention of policy makers, as Kingdon (1995/2002) indicated is common within the 
problem stream.  
A significant problem needed to be solved.  Interview participants each 
indicated that the schools were not serving the public well enough for the cost.  
Carroll stated, ―Too many kids were in bad schools.‖  Faso offered the following 
perspective: 
So I think more and more people became alarmed at the failure of results, and 
the traditional impetus of the political establishment was simply throw more 
money at it.  That, indeed, is still a common refrain of folks, just more money 
equates to better results.  I think we are now spending something in the 
neighborhood of $18,000 per child K-12.  And I think most people, most 
members of the public are not cognizant of that at all.  I think if you ask them 
they would give you a number more like $5,000 or $6,000.  …The key 
problem, the top three ones were the educational performance of and 
outcomes of children, the educational performance and outcomes of children, 
and the educational performance and outcomes of children. 
Carroll added the problem of teachers lacking autonomy to the mix but also 
indicated the problem of ―districts being left to their own devices would not clean up 
their low-performing schools‖ as critical.  Bellafiore cited the primary problem as 
poor academic performance in district schools coupled with few parental choices, 
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particularly for students from poor families and racial minorities.  He described the 
lack of choice problem as follows: 
Because they [inner-city Democrats] had been getting hosed by the system.  
These are people whose areas contained—gotten the least attention by the 
public school structure.  Nobody had any creative ideas to solve them, and 
they had been, you know, they had been neglected.  They‘re neglected in 
terms of difficulties in terms of school funding, difficulties in terms of 
attention; people didn‘t care about them.  You know, these are people in the 
South Bronx and Bedside and lousy parts of Buffalo where nobody was 
paying any attention, and people had fled.  People had no choice.  
In addition to the problems of cost and insufficient academic progress for at-
risk students, education was seen as having an impact on economic policy and 
development in New York State.  Backstrom described it as follows: 
There was a fairly dramatic cut in personal income taxes, about 25%.  It 
dropped New York from the most heavily taxed state in the nation to the most 
heavily taxed state in the nation, even with the 25% cut.  But that sort of took, 
from a public policy and public interest perspective, sort of took taxes and 
economic development off of the top three on the electorate‘s radar screen and 
dropped it down.  And after that move, every year education policy became 
more and more of a growing concern, not just for social policy but also for 
economic policy and the development of the state.  …I think that there was 
truly growing frustration with property taxes are probably the most significant 
element, but it wasn‘t just the bill people were paying, it was the fact that they 
saw nothing for it. 
Problem was brought to the attention officials by policy entrepreneurs.  
Although there was no dramatic or focusing event to cause policy makers to pay 
attention to the problems listed above, it was policy entrepreneurs who brought the 
issue to the attention of policy-making officials.  The sections above note the role the 
policy entrepreneurs played in bringing the issue before Governor Pataki.  
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Research Question 2: How Did the Perspectives of the Different Actors Influence 
the Multiple Authorizing Structures Featured in the Charter Schools Act? 
To answer Question 2, I collected and coded the transcribed interviews 
described in Chapter 3.  With the results of the previous section having indicated that 
it was primarily Governor Pataki and Speaker Silver, on behalf of the Assembly, 
acting as the chief decision-makers regarding the outcome of the bill, this section 
focuses on the perspectives of each.  I also note the perspectives on multiple 
authorizing of the policy entrepreneurs who so heavily influenced the process.  The 
section covers how the governor‘s desire to see school choice take hold in New York 
State, his political career, and his desire to strengthen executive powers that brought 
about multiple authorizing structures in the Charter Schools Act.  It also shows how 
the Speaker‘s conflict of his political interests and his self-interests ultimately 
influenced the bill‘s multiple authorizer feature.   
Governor Pataki’s ideology a key driver of multiple authorizer provision.  
Data from all interviews indicated that the governor‘s ideology regarding school 
choice was the primary reason he wanted to have a multiple authorizer provision in 
the Charter Schools Act.  As noted above, by some accounts, the governor‘s ideology 
was aligned with a traditionally conservative political philosophy of being a 
proschool choice, so as to create a competitive dynamic in public education, whereas 
others believed it was a primarily political set of motives that pushed Governor Pataki 
to support the charter schools effort.  
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In either case, the governor was clearly a proponent of the creation of quality 
charter schools.  To reach this end, he apparently believed that the state would need 
different avenues of charter creation to improve this possibility. 
Governor Pataki sought an active charter-school authorizing process.  
According to John Faso, the governor was primarily ―concerned with having a fair 
charter-authorizing process.‖ The interviews with all of the other participants 
indicated that ―fairness‖ was a proxy for the allowance of effective charters to exist at 
all, something he did not believe possible if charters were only authorized by the New 
York State Board of Regents.  The governor‘s views of the appropriate role of the 
Board of Regents was also a factor in his push for multiple authorizers. Governor 
Pataki‘s desire to see a path toward the emergence of effective charter schools was a 
reason he eventually wound up choosing the SUNY Board of Trustees as the 
additional authorizer to join the New York State Board of Regents.  Given the 
governor‘s intent to create an authorizing process that would yield a significant 
number of charter schools, he wanted at least one authorizer that would be able to 
certify them.  
Belief that the regents would not actively authorize charter schools.  His 
expectations of the regents were that they would not do so, and as such, his goal was 
to keep the decision making over charters from solely sitting with the state education 
department and the Board of Regents.  Faso put it this way:   
We knew that we couldn‘t depend upon the state education department to 
fairly and aggressively pursue the law.  We knew we had to have a separate 
authorizer…the education department being controlled by the Board of 
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Regents and the Board of Regents being effectively controlled in their 
appointment by the Speaker of the Assembly, they were really under a lot of 
their political persuasion.  So having this separate authorizer is key.  …So we 
knew that we couldn‘t depend upon the state education department to fairly 
and aggressively pursue the law.  We knew we had to have a separate 
authorizer. 
The expectation of the governor appeared to be that the Board of Regents 
would not have been inclined to advance the number of charter schools, given the 
nature of how the regents are appointed.  Murphy stated that the views from the 
governor‘s office were that the regents were ―not deemed friendly to the issue‖ of 
charter schools as a whole, despite there being some individuals who supported their 
existence.  He said, 
What was felt was that [the regents] just showed so little enthusiasm that the 
idea of entrusting them to this was a nonstarter; there had to be another 
avenue.  And that is something that just was held out for, and it was a matter 
of, you know, the Speaker not wanting that, of course, because the regents are 
ultimately the Assembly majority appointees, so that again was a classic clash 
of the branches of government. 
Bellafiore‘s statements on the issue were aligned with Murphy‘s: 
Everybody knew that if you left it to the regents to do charters, you would 
have no charters, and it didn‘t matter if your cap was 6 or 100 or 1, you 
wouldn‘t even have that, because they were not interested.  And for the first 
couple of years they had a hard time seeing why this stuff mattered, learning 
standards, 27 versus 6. …And that was if we had had the single authorizer, 
you wouldn‘t have any schools.  No question in my mind that you wouldn‘t 
have any schools; we would have very few, or you‘d have only ones that were 
no different from the ones that already existed, and I think Hayden will tell 
you.  
Bellafiore offered a different reason for doubting that the regents would 
ultimately authorize schools: basically that they had too many other responsibilities to 
take this one seriously. 
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Everybody had every expectation that SUNY would be out there great guns 
and that the state education Board of Regents would be kicking and 
screaming.  Because again it was not a priority for them.  I mean, they have all 
these other things that they are responsible for plus this little, for them it‘s a 
lot of work with 2% of the kids when they‘ve got to worry about 100%. 
Governor also wanted to weaken the regents.  The consensus of the interview 
participants was that the governor saw the Board of Regents as hostile to his agenda 
and wanted to keep them from control of charters if not weaken their power 
altogether.  That is, he saw them as likely barriers to seeing his ideological vision 
around school choice coming to fruition.  Tom Carroll noted that, like Governor 
Mario Cuomo before him, Governor Pataki considered ways to abolish the Board of 
Regents and thought that all of the education decision-making functions at the state 
level should be an executive function.  
Carl Hayden, the chairman of the regents at the time, indicated that because of 
their assumed differences in philosophy, the governor did indeed seek to weaken the 
power of the regents: 
The assumption would have been that we would have opposed any alteration 
to the existing scheme of things and particularly any change that would 
compromise our exclusive dominion over the education portfolio.  …I can‘t 
speak for Governor Pataki, but from his perspective he would not see the 
Board of Regents as a reliable steward.  He would, I think, have really 
questioned whether charters would get a fair shake under the regents. 
Hayden went on to indicate that Governor Pataki was passionate about 
holding control of at least one of the charter authorizing entities, and, as a result, he 
would not concede that issue.  Hayden also provided his personal, more nuanced view 
on charters, which seemingly justified the skepticism of the regents‘ support of 
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charters and ultimately their appropriate role in authorizing them.  Hayden put it this 
way: 
I think my concern was that charters were really stalking horses for vouchers, 
and vouchers are something that I opposed then and oppose now, because I 
believe in public education in all of its richness and all of its manifestations.  I 
do not believe in subsidized private education, public-subsidized private 
education.  So, I was concerned that the SUNY Board might simply use the 
charters or to be more direct about it, that the governor would simply see 
charters as a way station, sort of voucher school.  We had had two votes in the 
Board of Regents on whether or not to authorize vouchers, and the first time 
we voted was the only occasion, during my 12 years as a regent, that 
Governor Cuomo came across the street to talk to us.  And it was because he 
was so concerned that we might approve a publicly funded voucher system.  
…I was supportive of charters to the extent that they kept it out—the ability to 
innovate in a de-regulated environment.  I thought that that would be very 
useful.  What I didn‘t know was whether or not that was the whole agenda.. 
Governor Pataki chose SUNY as second authorizer for executive control.  
The governor‘s first design of charter authorization responsibilities was the proposed 
creation of an independent commission that would authorize charters for the state.  
The proposal, according to Bellafiore, was to create an independent committee that 
would authorize charters, consistent with the governor‘s pro-school-choice ideology.  
The idea, to have an appointee from the governor‘s office, Speaker‘s office, the 
Senate majority leader‘s office, and the two respective minority leaders‘ offices 
essentially would have given a functional majority to the Republicans.  Bellafiore 
stated: 
So my guess is that that came off the table and when the legislature said there 
is no way we‘re doing that.  …I think that happened at the negotiating table, 
and I think it was part of probably the Assembly saying we only want the 
regents, we don‘t want anybody else involved, and we don‘t want your 
commission because you dominate it. 
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Once this idea was rejected by the Speaker‘s office, Governor Pataki looked 
to the SUNY Board of Trustees.  In describing the push to give the SUNY board 
charter authorizing responsibilities, Bellafiore noted that the rational to use SUNY 
was likely an easier sell than that of the independent commission proposal: 
Then the governor went to SUNY and said, ―Well here‘s a body that the 
Senate confirms and that you have some oversight of through budget and 
other means.‖  And they also were involved in education, and they were 
already involved in teacher education, so it‘s not that hard to back it up, to 
move their role backwards in what is now commonly known as the pipeline. 
Tom Carroll noted that the governor wanted SUNY involved, not because it 
had any special expertise in charter schools, but because it was an entity that the 
executive branch could control.  Carroll stated, 
[SUNY was] an entity that he thought would, he could make sure stayed, 
reliably procharter.  And because they had a bunch of teacher colleges, you 
could plausibly that they had some involvement in K-12, so it wasn‘t like, you 
know, you gave it to the office of some other, like the Department of Labor 
was handling it or something.  It was an educational entity and he controlled 
it.  …At that time the SUNY board was much more a political instrument than 
it is today.  It was very ideological and it saw its primary, at least as I viewed 
it, it saw its primary allegiance as being owed the governor rather than the 
students. 
Put more bluntly, Carl Hayden said this of the relationship between SUNY‘s 
board and the governor: 
Republican penchant for good discipline got played out rather dramatically 
during the Pataki years.  I mean the—Tom Eagan [chairman of the SUNY 
Board of Trustees] would essentially do whatever it was that the governor 
suggested that he do, and he would command that the board fall in line.   
Perspectives of policy entrepreneurs led them to push for multiple 
authorizers to ensure a lasting policy.  The policy entrepreneurs who had been 
pushing for legislation that would allow for charter schooling in New York also 
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wanted to see such legislation feature multiple authorizers, albeit for slightly different 
reasons than the governor and Speaker.  Tom Carroll explained that Governor 
Pataki‘s election to the governor‘s office as a Republican was an ―historical 
anomaly,‖ and, therefore, his group of policy entrepreneurs did not want to put sole 
authorizing power with the governor‘s office.   
Similarly, we were not comfortable having the Board of Regents be the only 
entity.  In part because Carl Hayden at the time was lobbying against the 
adoption of the charter school laws, as the chancellor of the Board of Regents.  
…Putting the fox in charge of the hen house was kind of how he looked at the 
regents having total control.  
Backstrom indicated that for a number of the policy entrepreneurs, the ideal 
was in fact to have SUNY be the only authorizer: 
We had every indication that the regents had no interest in doing this, simply 
because they took their marching orders from a different general at the time.  
And so we saw it as a fairly clear case that we would see 50 charters and they 
would all be issued by SUNY.  
Speaker Silver had personal and political interests to consider.  According to 
interviews, the Speaker faced competing personal and political interests when it came 
to the decision of whether or not to allow a multiple authorizer provision in the 
Charter Schools Act.  His caucus‘s political ties to labor unions and his desire to 
preserve the power of the Assembly-nominated Board of Regents were one set of 
forces, whereas the desire to achieve a pay- raise for the Speaker and his colleagues in 
return for the act featuring multiple authorizers was the other.  
Preservation of regents put Speaker against multiple authorizers.  In the 
same way that Governor Pataki sought to weaken the role of the Board of Regents via 
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the multiple authorizer clause of the Charter Schools Act, the Speaker sought to limit 
the power of the executive and preserve the power of the regents.  According to Tom 
Carroll, 
The Speaker wanted the regents because the Speaker—the joint session of the 
legislature appoints, and he dominates that because he represents the most 
people in the assembly, so he wanted the regents because he controlled the 
regents, he appointed all of them.  …The Speaker understood the significance 
of it, too, which is why the Speaker was determined, as was Carl Hayden, to 
get them all authorized [by the regents]. 
Bellafiore described the regents as ―constitutionally anointed creators of 
policy and the Assembly appoints them,‖ going on to describe the Speaker‘s position 
as ―political and constitutional.‖  Therefore, according to Bellafiore, ―The Assembly 
originally wanted only the regents to have authorizing power and did not want 
multiple authorizers.‖  
Although the Assembly did appoint the Board of Regents, Carl Hayden 
asserted that they did not vote in lockstep or depend on cues from the legislature.  
Hayden said, 
The Board of Regents I think have always seen themselves differently than the 
SUNY board sees itself.  Members of the Board of Regents in my experience 
view themselves as sort of analogous to Supreme Court appointees.  It is 
obvious that they get to be appointed by virtue of a political process, but once 
there, they assert and value their independence.  And so although it doesn‘t 
get tested a lot, the Board of Regents is willing to act in ways that don‘t please 
the Speaker, at least they were under my chancellorship.  The same could not 
be said for the SUNY board and in its relationship to the governor.  
The Assembly listened to the views of the teacher unions.  Unions wanted 
fewer charters as they were seen as a weakening force because teachers in charters 
were not automatically enrolled in unions.  The view of the governor, according to 
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interviews, was of concern that the Assembly-appointed regents would create charter 
policy that would cater to the views of unions by ultimately limiting the number that 
would be authorized.  Hayden argued that that this would not have necessarily been 
the case:  
My expectations were that the Board of Regents would do their job honorably 
and well.  And that, contrary to the governor‘s fears, we would not only give 
charters a fair shake but would give the philosophy underlying charters an 
honest appraisal.  Part of this is whether or not we can learn lessons from de-
regulated schools that can be brought to scale more broadly and to create a 
better learning environment and a broader range of opportunities for kids, 
particularly kids at risk.  So, you know, there was never a question in my mind 
whether we were going to give charters a fair chance.  And of course from our 
vantage point, having appreciated the role of the unions and school boards and 
all of the things that kind of drive the system towards stasis, there were many 
of us who were excited to see whether the philosophical potential of charters 
could be realized. 
Bellafiore offered a take that the regents and therefore the Assembly believed 
in protecting the existing public educational system.  
They believed that schools that have—they believe the rules are in place for a 
reason.  The regulations are in place for a reason and that the structures that 
currently exist in the district K-12 system won‘t matter, and that the only thing 
that they really need is more money.  I think that is a deeply held personal 
philosophy, and to their dying day they will all say that that is the right way to 
do it.   
The Speaker and Assembly wanted a raise.  Although no data from the 
interviews showed a causal effect of multiple authorizers‘ being the critical trade-off 
for the Assembly to be granted a pay raise, each interview participant did indicate that 
the pay raise was only granted due to the agreement to allow for the Charter Schools 
Act altogether.  The governor therefore had the leverage to insist upon the key 
features of the bill, including the existence of multiple charter authorizers.  Therefore, 
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pressure to gain a pay raise also played an active role in terms of the Speaker‘s 
perspective regarding the features of the Charter Schools Act.  Tom Carroll pointed 
out that the legislature‘s ―self-interest was misaligned with their political interest, and 
they would choose self-interest over political interest.‖  Carl Hayden said, 
It was a classic example of the Albany political dynamic. It involved a very 
simple transactional matter which was the members of the legislature got a 
38% pay increase and the governor got a Charter Schools Act, which among 
other things took away a small piece of jurisdiction from the Board of Regents 
and gave it to the State University of New York. 
 Ultimately, a compromise was struck.  With the interests of the governor 
and Speaker being met, the result was a bill that allowed for multiple authorizing 
powers.  The compromise allowed for both the SUNY Board of Trustees and the 
Board of Regents to independently authorize charters but also preserved the right of 
the regents to object to the decisions of the trustees.  Although these objections would 
be noted, they would ultimately have no consequence if the SUNY Board of Trustees 
decided not to reverse their original decision.  Carroll called it the ―ping pong 
provision‖: 
The governor said, ―It‘s got to be an entity I control—SUNY.‖  The Speaker 
is saying, ―No, it‘s got to be the Board of Regents, which I control.‖  And then 
they go, okay well, it will be half and half then.  And then the Speaker said, 
―Well, I still don‘t want—.‖ You know, the regents is supposed to be control 
of everything in the state and so the regents have to have the final say.  …One 
of the two of them came up with the idea of saying well, okay, they can have 
the final saying that they actually issue the charter, but SUNY has to have the 
responsibility, and then the Speaker said—this went back and forth over 
several hours.  Then the Speaker said, ―Well, they have to have the ability to 
review the applications and veto them if they want to,‖ and then the governor 
said, ―Well, they can review them, but they can‘t feed on them, because then 
you‘re not going to approve any,‖ so you got this like really awkward hybrid 
situation, and it literally was just two political figures haggling over a 
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compromise when they had two competing views of where it should come 
out. 
Research Question 3: How Do the Multiple Authorizing Structures Created in 
New York State in 1998 Affect the Current Work of Charter School 
Authorization in the State? 
To answer Research Question 3, I examined the interview transcripts collected 
via the process outlined in Chapter 3, aiming to determine how the multiple 
authorizing structures affected the work of charter school authorization in the state.  
The multiple authorizer provision of the Charter Schools Act allowed for both 
statewide authorizers to authorize schools.  Interview transcripts yielded two themes.  
First, although little was mentioned in the interviews regarding SUNY‘s practices, 
interview participants talked a great deal about the surprising outcome of the Board of 
Regents authorizing a large number of schools.  Second, there were generally more 
advantages to having multiple authorizers in place than disadvantages, particularly 
the benefits of competition and the diffusing of political pressures.  
More authorizing than expected from regents.  The majority of interview 
participants did not expect authorizing the activity from regents that ultimately took 
place.  This belief, according to Tom Carroll, stemmed from a commonly held belief 
that the regents did not think any entity should have the authorizing responsibility.  
Once authorizing was assigned to both SUNY and the Board of Regents, the state 
education department, acting as the staff for the regents, did not place a great deal of 
internal resources in that activity.  Carroll described the lack of resources initially put 
into the state education department‘s authorizing work, saying, ―The equivalent of a 
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bureaucratic neon sign was put up that this was a low priority within the department.‖  
Carroll noted that the staff capacity and relative priorities at the state education 
department put into charter authorizing caused observers to doubt the ultimate 
authorizing behavior of the NYSED and Board of Regents.  Carroll noted, ―You have 
all these loaned people, and the loaned people generally are grumpy that they have 
been tasked to what is viewed as a low-prestige task within the department of 
education.‖  
Bellafiore seemed to concur by noting his belief that charter authorizing 
simply was not a priority for the regents, more due to the multitude of other functions 
required of the state education department.  ―I mean, they have all these other things 
that they are responsible for plus this little, for them it‘s a lot of work with 2% of the 
kids when they‘ve got to worry about 100%.‖   
Carl Hayden, on the other hand, expected that the ―Board of Regents would 
do their job honorably and well.‖  He went on to say that, contrary to the governor‘s 
fears, the regents would ―not only give charters a fair shake, but would give the 
philosophy underlying charters an honest appraisal.‖  He went on to say, 
In my mind whether we were going to give charters a fair chance and, of 
course, from our vantage point, having appreciated the role of the unions and 
school boards and all of the things that kind of drive the system towards stasis, 
there were many of us who were excited to see whether the philosophical 
potential of charters could be realized. 
Regents ultimately issued charters.  Whether it was due to an institutional 
competition or institutional pride, the regents ultimately issued an equal numbers of 
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charters relative to SUNY.  This was surprising to a few of the interview participants.  
John Faso noted, 
I anticipated that the education department would be much more hostile, and I 
think on balance the education department has done a reasonably good job.  I 
mean I don‘t—I think maybe some of the fears I had—I think frankly because 
SUNY has done a good job, I think the education department has looked at 
this and said, ―We have to do a good job, too.‖ 
According to Peter Murphy, it was in part competition that led to what he also 
labeled as a surprise seeing the regents authorize a number of schools.  
I think they wanted to show you, well, you guys have New Covenant [an 
underperforming charter], and we‘re going to have these, and I think Hayden 
was the chancellor at the time, so he was in favor of that, and so they actually 
were a better, they turned out better than I would have predicted. 
Tom Carroll noted that it was essentially the competition that drove the 
regents‘ authorizing of charters:  
What‘s left unknown forever is whether if SUNY did not exist whether they 
would have issued any of them.  …Whether it was competition or something 
else entirely, the most participants indicated a belief that earning a charter 
from either entity was duly difficult and resulted in success.  
Backstrom also argued that it was the competition that drove the regents toward 
authorizing activity in order to stay relevant:  
We were rather surprised that the regents started issuing charters.  I think it 
was sparked primarily by the political ship in New York City and Bloomberg-
Klein started driving a lot of it, but what we saw is the regents, almost 
desperately what they could do, make sure that they were players in every 
educational policy decision being made in New York State.  And when they 
started seeing charter schools, you know, in the K-12 arena being developed 
by somebody else, they seemed motivated to jump on the train as well.  The 
evolution then, once they started activity, the evolution or where the two 
entities went became somewhat different in terms of SUNY, we felt took the 
approach more of a cooperative adventure for stronger schools than the 
regents took the approach of ―let‘s be as bureaucratic as we‘ve ever been.‖  
…A large but high-quality number of charter schools exist due to the multiple 
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authorizer provision.  I think what we have is probably the most we could 
make out of it. 
Regents took strict reading of law.  Not only did the regents end up 
authorizing more schools that many anticipated, but they also did so in a far different 
manner than did the SUNY Board of Trustees.  Hayden described the regents‘ 
approach toward authorizing as follows:  
First I, if I look at this from the perspective of the regents, they believe now as 
they believed then that they were fairly applying the charter school law to the 
process of authorization.  From where I sit now, I can see that, although I 
don‘t assert that they are applying the law unfairly, but I certainly do believe 
that there are strictly construing the law, and they do not have an expansive 
view of the statute, of its scope or of its possibilities. 
For Lubin, the regents weren‘t strict enough: ―I think we expected the regents 
to be more thorough, expected the department to be more thorough than the SUNY 
institute, and at the beginning we really didn‘t see that.‖  
More advantages than disadvantages in having multiple authorizers.  
Whereas there are advantages and disadvantages to having multiple authorizers in 
place, as discussed in Chapter 2, interview participants in this study only pointed to 
advantages of the multiple authorizing system created in New York State.  Such 
advantages included competition leading to higher quality authorizing and a 
balancing and ultimate diffusion of political pressures and influences.  
Competition between the two authorizers has led to positive outcomes.  
Interview participant responses included a number of points regarding the quality of 
authorizing in New York State being generally high.  The first advantage of the 
competition was the fact that charters were authorized at all.  Bellafiore stated, ―No 
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question in my mind that you wouldn‘t have any schools, we would have very few, or 
you‘d have only ones that were no different from the ones that already.‖ 
John Faso believed the regents would not authorize schools if not for the 
competitive system set up via multiple authorizers, because it would not be in their 
best interest to do so: 
You can bring more kinds of pickings to the table and not have the people 
who are responsible for the current system be also responsible for the 
alternative to the current system.  Organizationally it does not work.  You 
know, it would be like living in a one-party government and telling the one 
party, ―Okay, you need to now develop a robust alternative to yourself.‖  It‘s 
just not going to happen.  And also the posture of the establishment—the K-12 
establishment was very hostile. 
Not only did the competition lead to greater numbers of charters, but multiple 
interview respondents noted that having multiple authorizers led to a competition that 
spurred quality as well.  Tom Carroll stated, ―You actually have a race, I think, going 
on now where there is pressure on both entities to raise the quality they‘re 
authorizing, not to go in the other direction.‖  
Faso noted the multiple authorizers started pushing each other due to 
competition: 
If SUNY were doing a crappy job and not pursuing this effectively, I think 
that you‘d probably see some diminished results and performance from [the] 
state ed[ucation department].  But I think really having this creative tension 
between the two authorizers is very healthy.  It keeps them both on their toes. 
This quote from Carl Hayden indicated that the regents have gone out of their 
way to step up their game so as to make an argument that they should be the only 
authorizer in the state.  According to Hayden, this sense of competition was a result 
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of the regents‘ feeling like authorizing responsibility should have exclusively been 
theirs: 
You know, it still is very grating to the regents who have been responsible for 
all of public education since Teddy Roosevelt, who have had this important 
piece of their jurisdictional responsibility frankly ripped out of their body.  
And that‘s a wound that does not heal, and that explains why they have been 
so active politically to try to reacquire exclusive jurisdiction.  Now, at the 
moment I think that would be a bad idea, because as the Charter Schools Act 
has played out in real life, you see that the SUNY board and the Charter 
School Institute approach, the task of authorizing, quite differently than the 
regents do.  And I think New York has likely benefited from the fact that there 
are two approaches. Because you know this, too, is a noble experiment.  I‘ll be 
very interested to see which approach yields the stronger schools at the 
moment.  At the moment I would argue that SUNY‘s approach does, but it‘s 
still very early.  
Different entities mean different sets of political pressures.  Multiple 
respondents noted that political pressures and biases were assuaged by having 
multiple authorizers in place.  That is, with different agencies, one appointed by the 
Democrat-controlled Assembly and the other by the Republican executive branch, no 
one political body could control the charter authorizing activity.  Murphy said, ―There 
were different political pressures, which again confirmed the wisdom of having the 
dual authorizers.  It‘s not just they have different kind of quality issues; they have 
different political pressures to deal with.‖ 
Tom Carroll expounded on the notion that the nationwide trend of having 
single authorizers was at risk due to potential political turnover: 
That you needed to have multiple authorizers, because in some states that had 
a single authorizer—not all, Florida would be an exception—and the states 
who had what might be called constipated charter school statutes, they often 
were because they had a single authorizer. There were some high charter 
states that had single authorizer, but that generally was because the single 
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authorizer was an education department under the direct control of a 
procharter governor. In the New York context, where we knew Pataki would 
not be governor for long because it was almost an historical anomaly to have a 
Republican the governor of this state, we were not comfortable with having 
just Pataki, you know, have a single authorizing entity.  Similarly we were not 
comfortable having the Board of Regents be the only entity.  In part because 
Carl Hayden at the time was lobbying against the adoption of the charter 
school laws, was the chancellor of the Board of Regents.  Putting the fox in 
charge of the hen house was kind of how he looked at the regents‘ having total 
control.  And what has happened particularly in the multiple authorizers is we 
always wondered whether if you had SUNY as an authorizer and the regents, 
whether the regents would ever issue any.  
Carroll went on to describe why adding the multiple authorizer position 
ultimately kept political biases out of controlling the authorizing work in the state: 
And the political biases of, in a state with multiple authorizers, the authorizers 
will often have institutional or political biases depending on who creates them 
or where they sit.  Because a lot of times what your views are or what you 
think is a function of where you sit, because it frames your perspective.  And 
so having multiple authorizers that had a different view in the world and 
different political arrangements, we thought would help insure as the politics 
changed over time that at any one time, somebody would be willing to issue 
charters.  What has not happened, which would be the fear of multiple 
authorizers, is the fear of having multiple accredited agencies, why you have 
like a cartel arrangement for higher ed[ucation], is that it would actually 
promote a race to the bottom, in which everybody would want to have like the 
most, want all the schools to come to them so they‘d make it easier.  
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, I outlined the results of the interviews conducted to determine 
interview participants‘ perceptions of the charter policy-making process in New York 
State.  Coded interview transcripts yielded great alignment between Kingdon‘s 
multiple streams framework and the processes that led to the passage of the New 
York State Charter Schools Act.  Discussion of these results and recommendations 
for future policy and research follow in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 An examination of the findings in Chapter 4, combined with a consideration 
of the literature review presented in Chapter 2, yields noteworthy discoveries, policy 
recommendations, and further questions.  In attempting to determine the processes 
that led to current multiple authorizing structures in New York State, the perspectives 
of the different actors who influenced the creation of multiple authorizing structures, 
and the manner by which the authorization systems affect the current work of charter 
school authorization in the state, I utilized the lens of Kingdon‘s multiple streams 
framework.  In this chapter I build the argument that New York‘s experience in 
creating the New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 as a whole supports the 
tenets of Kingdon‘s multiple streams framework.  Following this, I argue that the 
resulting multiple authorizer structure was advantageous to New York State‘s charter 
sector.  I close the chapter with a policy recommendation and suggestions for further 
research.  
Application of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework 
 The processes and perspectives that led to the passage of the New York State 
Charter Schools Act of 1998 generally support the application of Kingdon‘s multiple 
streams framework at the state policy-making level.  Kingdon (1995/2002) asserted 
that a rare opportunity where problem, politics, and policy collide allows for agenda 
items to rise.  With the will of Governor Pataki in place, the problem having been 
kept alive by policy entrepreneurs, and the policy of the pay raise for legislators 
opening a policy window, a policy collision did indeed take place in 1998.  There 
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appeared less consistency, however, with the problem stream.  Additionally, I will 
explain that there is cause to further consider the degree to which Kindgon‘s streams 
are more interdependent at the state level when compared to his federal model. 
Below, I present subsections on the policy, political, and problem streams. 
Policy stream. Two central themes arose in examining the passage of the 
New York State Charter Schools Act in relation to Kingdon‘s policy stream.  First, 
policy entrepreneurs, a group of diverse specialists, kept the issue of charter schools 
alive.  Second, technical feasibility and value acceptability were present and 
necessary for the proposed policy to survive—ultimately determining that the 
resulting structure was the only one possible for the proposed bill to have become 
law.   
 Policy entrepreneurs are critical. As explained in Chapter 4, Tom Carroll, 
Brian Backstrom, Bob Bellafiore, Peter Murphy, and other policy entrepreneurs kept 
the possibility of a law calling for New York charter schools alive long enough for 
the problem that needed to be solved to ―float by.‖  They did so by building 
coalitions, repeatedly bringing the issue to the governor‘s attention, and ultimately 
situating the issue in a position to take advantage of the open policy window.  
 Just as Mintrom (1997) described the approach of policy entrepreneurs in the 
area of school choice policy, New York State‘s charter school policy entrepreneurs 
engaged in significant amounts of networking in and around government and 
providing high-quality information to decision makers.  Also consistent with Mintrom 
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and Kingdon, Tom Carroll and his colleagues convinced key politicians to overcome 
their risk-averse nature. 
The policy entrepreneurs in this case used persistence and coupling, 
effectively attaching problems to solutions via individuals receptive to their ideas, 
consistent with examples given by Zahariadis (1999) and Mulholland and 
Shakespeare (2005).  In this study, the problem was in part underperforming public 
schools.  Evidence also pointed to the problem being that the Republican governor 
needed an issue he found worthy enough to trade for a legislative pay raise.  It was 
this problem that the policy entrepreneurs helped Governor Pataki solve.  
 Technical feasibility and value acceptability present.  Policy entrepreneurs, 
consistent with Kingdon‘s theory and studies that followed, defined the policy 
problems in ways that both attracted the attention of decision makers and indicated 
appropriate policy responses (Kingdon, 1995/2002; Majone, 1988; Polsby, 1984).  
They also built coalitions and gained support by making decisions about which issues 
to push and how to push them.  This work of ensuring technical feasibility and value 
acceptability was a key step in building Governor Pataki‘s investment in the issue.  
 While not explicitly stated, the interview data led me to conclude that creating 
multiple authorizer structures was a key factor in establishing the technical feasibility 
needed to allow the bill to move forward.  Data supports that Governor Pataki would 
not have allowed the bill forward with the Board of Regents becoming the only entity 
allowed to authorize charters.  In addition, the Speaker of the Assembly would not 
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have allowed for Governor Pataki‘s controlled SUNY Board of Trustees to be the 
sole entity to authorize charters unchecked.   
 Kingdon‘s framework appears to assume that there will be an assessment of 
acceptability and feasibility by governmental review groups, as is the case at the 
federal level via agencies like the Congressional Budget Office. At the state level, 
however, particularly in cases like the last minute passage of the  Charter Schools 
Act, such determinations are not conducted by neutral groups for consideration. 
Rather, it is up to each of the key actors to determine impact for themselves.   
 Political stream. Consistent with Young et al. (2010), Kingdon‘s national-
level model applies to this example of state-level policy making from the perspective 
that the Governor or state executive branch was the key determinant force in bringing 
about the policy.  Less in congruence with Kingdon‘s theory was the influence of 
political party, upcoming elections, and special interest groups.  
 A strong executive drives the political stream and ultimate policy.  
Consistent with Kingdon‘s argument that politicians set the agenda, Governor 
Pataki‘s desire to see school choice take hold in New York State, his political career, 
and his desire to strengthen executive powers influenced the creation of multiple 
authorizing structures in the New York State Charter Schools Act.  Kingdon 
(1995/2002) found that specialists sort out which policy alternatives a proposal might 




As with Young et al. (2010), Kingdon‘s finding that at the federal level the 
President can significantly advance an issue onto the decision agenda, this study 
demonstrates that a governor can have parallel influence at the state level.  Also 
consistent with Young et al., the findings of this study yield a connection between 
Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) federal-focused model and a specific issue within a state 
policy-making context, both influenced by the executive branch. Young et al. 
recommended that those wishing to influence policy should consider the election of 
new governors or appointees as an opportune time to push educational issues onto the 
decision agenda. 
 Special interest groups considered but influence negligible. With a strong 
likelihood of an assured Governor Pataki re-election ahead, unlike Kingdon‘s 
(1995/2002) finding at the federal level, upcoming elections in New York and 
political party views were not factors in the placement of charter schools on the 
agenda.  Still, there was evidence of consideration to the perspectives of special 
interest groups.  Both pro- and anticharter lobbies were part of the process, but little 
evidence shows that either had significant influence in comparison to the role of the 
executive.  
Kingdon (1995/2002) said politicians must consider the consequences they 
face if they wish to go against a powerful interest group.  There is some evidence that 
policy makers did pay attention to key interest groups like influential, conservative 
think tanks who were necessary for reelection, but little evidence as to the degree to 
which this occurred.  Holderness (1992) found that aside from a few, specific, gifted-
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education advocacy groups, no special interest lobbies benefited from the changes in 
gifted education, and thus the policy community was relatively small and 
uninfluential.  Young et al. (2010) found that more people were affected by reading 
policy and thus more attention was created than in Holderness‘s study of gifted 
education.  In the case of the New York State Charter Schools Act, negotiations took 
place with the teachers‘ unions, but there is little evidence that the unions could have 
ultimately prevented Speaker Silver and Governor Pataki from reaching the 
agreement they did.  This is illustrated in Lubin‘s description of state teacher unions‘ 
nonopposition of the New York State Charter Schools Act being in clear conflict to 
their views on charter schools in general.  
Problem stream. The processes that led to the passage of the New York State 
Charter Schools Act featured general components of Kingdon‘s problem stream but 
were not as clearly aligned as the political or policy streams.  The primary consistent 
piece was that a problem did arise that needed to be solved, and a potential solution to 
that problem was brought to the attention of policy makers by policy entrepreneurs.  
Kingdon‘s (1995/2002) model features the existence of a ―focusing event,‖ but there 
did not appear to be evidence of such in this study.    
 A significant problem needed to be solved.  In this case, a problem was 
underperforming public schools.  Yet, there was also the issue of the Republican 
governor needing an issue he found attractive enough to trade in return for a pay raise 
for the Democrat-controlled legislature.  
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Interview participants each indicated that the schools were not serving the 
public well enough for the cost.  As Carroll stated that ―too many kids were in bad 
schools,‖ Bellafiore cited the primary problem as poor academic performance in 
district schools coupled with few parental choices, particularly for students from poor 
families and racial minorities.  In addition to the problem of insufficient academic 
progress, educational outcomes were seen as having an impact on economic policy 
and development in New York State.  The idea of injecting the system with choice 
and potential competition toward efficiency via charters was seen by charter 
proponents as a potentially worthwhile solution. 
Governor Pataki also had an opportunity to put charter school policy, and an 
otherwise more difficult issue to pass, on the table in exchange for a legislative pay 
raise.  The question of which issue to push forward was one for which he turned to his 
staff and advisors, some of whom, as described above, pushed the issue of charter 
schools.  This issue was generally not a popular one with the Democratic power base 
in the legislature, but, according to the interviews, was tolerable in light of the 
resulting pay raise.   
 No particular focusing event.  As per Kingdon, it became clear that a 
significant problem needed to be solved. The problem was brought to the attention of 
the policy makers by the policy entrepreneurs, but unlike Fusarelli (2001) and 
Kingdon, it is not evident that a dramatic or ―focusing event‖ seized the attention of 
policymakers.  Instead, I would label this juncture as a clear focusing opportunity.  
That is, unlike the example of A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence 
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in Education, 1983) driving a number of reforms in the 1980s, there was not one 
event or vehicle that drove charters to rise to the attention of key policy makers.  
Rather, policy entrepreneurs recognized the legislative pay raise as a significant 
politically expedient opportunity to move otherwise difficult legislation—in this case, 
charter school policy.  
Streams less independent at the state level. Kingdon (1995/2002) points out 
that the policy, political, and problem streams tend to operate independently from one 
another.  In this state level case study, however, evidence suggests that the streams 
are interrelated and interdependent as a number of the policy entrepreneurs and 
processes were interacting and shifting each other‘s course of action.  That is, there 
was a close working relationship between members of Governor Pataki‘s staff like 
Peter Murphy and Bob Bellafiore and outside policy entrepreneurs like Tom Carroll 
and Brian Backstrom.  John Faso, a politician who moved charter legislation forward 
before the Charter Schools Act, also played the role of policy entrepreneur.  A 
possibility exists that this interdependence has to do with the state policy landscape 
being smaller, with far fewer actors than those found at the federal level.  
Advantages of the multiple authorizer structure. The research has noted 
both costs and benefits associated with multiple authorizers structures, but 
particularly from the perspective of charter proponents, the New York State system 
yielded distinct advantages.  The number of resulting charters, the competition 
between the two authorizers, and diffused political pressures were the primary 
advantages realized as a result of the multiple authorizer system.   
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 Competition between authorizers strengthened charter school growth.  
The majority of interview participants did not expect the authorizing activity from the 
Board of Regents that ultimately took place.  As noted in Chapter 4, this expectation, 
according to Tom Carroll, stemmed from a commonly held belief that the Regents felt 
no other entity should have authorizing responsibility.  Once authorizing was 
assigned to both SUNY and the Board of Regents, NYSED in acting as the staff for 
the Regents did not place a great deal of internal resources in that activity.  
This outcome could be indicative of what the research has said, that state 
boards of education consistently have been found to be among those authorizers most 
likely to be affected by politics (Bierlein Palmer, 2006; Bierlein Palmer & Gau, 2003; 
Gau, 2006; Hassel & Batdorff, 2004; Hill et al., 2001).  Carroll noted the lack of 
resources initially put into the NYSED‘s authorizing work, saying, ―The equivalent of 
a bureaucratic neon sign was put up that this was a low priority within the 
department.‖  Carroll also noted that the staff capacity and relative priorities at the 
NYSED into charter authorizing caused observers to doubt the ultimate authorizing 
behavior of the NYSED and the Board of Regents.  Despite indicators otherwise, the 
Regents ultimately approved nearly as many charters as the SUNY Trustees.  
Even though they chartered more schools than expected, the Board of Regents 
did so in a different manner than did the SUNY Board of Trustees.  The research has 
suggested that state education departments, commissioners, and boards of education 
tend to have a traditional focus on compliance (Hassel et al., 2006).  Lake (2006) 
explained that many charter schools have no option but to negotiate with an 
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unfriendly authorizer, resulting in high oversight fees, burdensome regulations, and 
disadvantageous terms.  According to interview responses, this compliance emphasis 
was consistent throughout the regents‘ authorizing work via the NYSED.  
Given the general expectation that the Board of Regents would not authorize 
schools, the interviews yielded a general presumption that the multiple authorizer 
structure made an impact on the number of charters ultimately authorized.  Lake 
(2008) and Mead and Rotherham (2007) suggested that state departments of 
education are not typically predisposed to authorize large numbers of charters.  It was 
clear from the interview responses that the NYSED was likely to follow suit if the 
state department of education was the only charter authorizer.  With the predicted 
focus on compliance referenced earlier via interviews and Hassel et al. (2006), one 
could predict that the NYSED would be more stringent in awarding charters at all, or 
that fewer charter applicants would choose to apply to the NYSED for fear of a high 
focus on compliance.  Bierlein Palmer et al. (2006) explained that centralized 
authorizer systems create the possibility for a sole authorizer to become a burdensome 
monopoly.   
With two statewide authorizers in place, however, the maximum number of 
schools by law was authorized.  This finding is consistent with research from the U.S. 
Department of Education Office of Innovation and Improvement (2007) that featuring 
multiple authorizers in a state increases the quantity of charter schools.  Multiple 
interview respondents noted that having multiple authorizers led to a competition that 
spurred quality as well.  
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 Diffused political pressures. Consistent with some prior research, multiple 
respondents noted that the roles of political pressures and biases were assuaged by 
having multiple authorizers in place (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 
2009; National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2009b).  That is, with 
different agencies, one appointed by the Democrat-controlled Assembly and the other 
by the Republican executive branch, no singular political body could effectively 
control the charter authorizing activity in the state.  Adding the multiple authorizer 
provisions ultimately kept political biases out of controlling the authorizing work in 
the state.  This makes it more difficult for any one politician to influence a decision to 
be made by an authorizing entity, such as whether or not to create or renew a charter 
contract.  New York is the only state I found to exhibit this particular arrangement 
relative to controlling governmental bodies split between executive and legislative 
branches.  Of the other states that feature multiple authorizing agencies and 
structures, there is most commonly only one governmental body responsible for 
oversight.  It will be important to study the impact of any other state moving to a 
structure similar to that of New York State, a structure I recommend below.   
Policy Recommendations 
The processes and perspectives that led to the passage of the New York State 
Charter Schools Act of 1998, when considered in the context of the research, lead me 
to policy recommendations focused on the number and independence of state charter 
authorizers.  By limiting the number of statewide authorizers in New York State to 
the Board of Regents and the SUNY Board of Trustees, policy makers created a 
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system that was not ultimately politically controlled by any one party or 
governmental branch and therefore had lasting power. As it turned out, while the act 
was passed during the administration of a Republican executive in Governor Pataki, 
the SUNY entity has continued to do its work under the jurisdiction of three 
consecutive Democratic governors.  There have been efforts by the Assembly, who 
continue to appoint the regents, to eliminate the authorizing power of the SUNY 
Trustees.  As the appointment of the SUNY Trustees is a power of the executive, any 
weakening of the power of the Trustees would be a weakening of the powers of the 
executive.  
Indeed, the research backs this argument that creating at least one independent 
or non–board of education entity and dividing powers between political parties are 
advantageous.  Mead and Rotherham (2007) described a nationwide trend whereby 
states are moving away from reliance on local district authorizers and toward ―more 
professional authorizing led by organizations that operate across an entire state or 
region, view chartering as a core part of their mission, and oversee significant 
numbers of schools‖ (p. 5).  In fact, there is a general consensus that smaller 
chartering entities, such as local districts, are more likely to be affected by politics 
(Bierlein Palmer, 2006; Bierlein Palmer & Gau, 2003; Gau, 2006; Hassel & Batdorff, 
2004; Hill et al., 2001).   
Policy makers in New York were ultimately supported by the research when it 
came to including SUNY Trustees as an authorizer.  By utilizing the SUNY Charter 
Schools Institute, the Trustees exemplified the findings of Bierlein Palmer (2006) that 
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higher education institution authorizers display moderate interest in authorizing, 
relatively strong political insulation, and an ability to create necessary infrastructure.  
In the study, nonprofits, universities, and separate state charter boards all received 
―moderate,‖ ―fairly strong,‖ or ―strong‖ marks.  Municipalities, county and regional 
boards, and local boards all received ―moderate,‖ ―limited,‖ and ―very limited‖ 
scores.  The only nonlocal authorizer type to receive ―limited‖ marks was state boards 
of education (Bierlein Palmer, 2006).   
 Researchers have agreed that successful charter school authorizers exhibit 
political independence (Bierlein Palmer, 2006; National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools, 2009).  Different types of charter school authorizers are exposed to different 
forms and amounts of political pressures (Bierlein Palmer, 2006; Bierlein Palmer & 
Gau, 2003).  The experience in New York State created via the processes that led to 
the New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 provides further evidence that a split 
between legislative oversight responsibilities at the very least diffuses the political 
pressures on charter authorizers. 
Outstanding Questions 
Both the limitations and findings of this treatise call for a number of follow-up 
studies in order to more fully illustrate the impact of the multiple charter schools 
authorizer system in New York State.  These include looking at the effect of 
authorizers by type and state authorizer policy, student achievement numbers by 
relative authorizer structures nationwide, and the impact of a variety of political 
environments on charter school policy. 
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New York State charter authorizer performance.  Critical information to 
the discussion of the impact of the policies created under the New York State Charter 
Schools Act is found in focusing on the student achievement data and school closure 
data broken down by authorizer.  Hoxby and Murarka (2009) conducted an analysis 
that included a disaggregation of data by authorizer in New York City, but no such 
study has been conducted statewide. This work is possible given the detailed in-house 
data kept by both the NYSED and the SUNY Charter Schools Institute. 
Policy makers would be further informed with research focused on the 
approval rate of new schools, the number of schools identified as underperforming, 
and the closure rate of schools by each authorizing entity.  Whether authorizers are 
willing to exercise their power to close chronically underperforming schools can be 
potentially as illustrative of their commitment to student achievement as the 
performance of the schools they allow to open in the first place. It would be important 
for policy makers to know whether the rate of closure of these underperforming 
schools increases in a state or region featuring multiple authorizers.  
  Nationwide authorizer effectiveness.  Researchers and experts have begun to 
report on authorizer effectiveness and on state policies concerning charter school 
authorizers (Lake, 2008; Mead & Rotherham, 2007).  Next steps could include 
comparing authorizer structures and student achievement outcomes.  Raymond (2009) 
found that states empowering multiple charter schools authorizers realize negative 
student achievement results.  
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An examination of the ease of authorization process would be helpful to the 
research of charter effectiveness.  Schober et al. (2006) revealed that the easier the 
overall charter application and authorization process was in a state, the more charter 
schools that state was likely to have.  Because this study examined a single policy-
making example in a single state, these findings are not generalizable to all issues or 
state policy environments.   
Political environments.  Further research should also examine the emergence 
of authorizer systems across several states to better determine the true interplay 
between authorizing policy and political environments.  Data from this study show 
that the political conditions that existed in New York State in 1998 had direct impact 
on the structure of the state‘s charter policy.  The outcomes of similarly structured 
studies across states could yield a number of implications for those seeking to 
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